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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) exploits the inherent strangeness of quantum me-
chanics to improve secure communication, enabling two pre-authenticated partici-
pants to establish symmetric encryption keys over long distances, without making
any assumptions about the computational abilities of an adversary. QKD commonly
relies on the transmission and detection of single photons to distribute the secret
keys, but the secret-key generation rates are often limited by hardware, namely the
ability to produce or detect nonclassical states of light. We address this challenge by
using high-dimensional encoding to increase the secure information yield per detected
photon. In this thesis, we present security analysis for and the first demonstrations of
a resource-efficient high-dimensional QKD protocol, including two varieties of imple-
mentation that each have different strengths and weaknesses. We introduce a 42-km
deployed fiber testbed that we use to demonstrate our high-dimensional QKD proto-
col. We also demonstrate the violation of a steering inequality, confirming that we can
produce entanglement in the lab and distribute it over the deployed fiber. By these
experiments, we demonstrate both the utility of our high-dimensional QKD protocol
and the feasibility of our testbed for further applications in quantum communication
and networking.
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If Bob also measures in the FB, his result is again correlated with
Alice's; otherwise, the measurement results are uncorrelated. Alice
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over which they communicate during the classical postprocessing stage. 42
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1 kcps background count rate, a 93% detector efficiency, and a 100 ns
detector reset time after each detection event. Three regions are de-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation for quantum key distribution
1.1.1 The quantum menace
As a society, we rely heavily on communication networks: we conduct financial trans-
actions, we transmit personal and/or sensitive information, and we socially interact
with other people. We store data on remote cloud servers to retrieve it from any
physical location. We conduct searches to access a wide range of information. How-
ever, we cannot always control the route our data packets take between source and
destination [9, 101. On untrusted routes, our data is vulnerable to interception by
unauthorized agents, and it should not have to be. Encryption is vital for securing
our data'.
To encrypt our communications, most of today's secure Internet traffic uses public-
key cryptography to authenticate and establish shared session keys between remote
entities. However, public-key cryptosystems are not unconditionally secure; their se-
curity relies on the difficulty of solving certain mathematical problems and on the
assumption that the computational resources needed to solve those problems are un-
feasible for an adversary. Three of the most commonly used public-key schemes,
Diffie-Hellman (DH) [12], RSA [13], and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [14, 15],
'And for keeping it private - security 1 privacy, but both are important 1111.
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underpin most of the cryptography used on the Internet today [161. These cryptosys-
tems all rely on the hardness of integer factorization or computing discrete logarithms.
A quantum computer implementing Shor's algorithm [171 could (in theory) break DH,
RSA, and ECC easily by finding discrete logarithms and factoring numbers in poly-
nomial time - scaling exponentially better than the current best known classical
algorithm, the number field sieve [18, 19].
In light of this quantum threat, Mosca motivates the investigation of quantum-
resistant cryptographic solutions by comparing three time intervals [20]:
1. The security shelf-life, or how long the cryptographic keys must remain secure
(denoted as x).
2. The migration time, or how long it will take to deploy a set of quantum-safe
security tools (denoted as y).
3. The collapse time, or how long it will take for a quantum computer (or some-
thing else) to break the currently deployed public-key tools (denoted as z).
If x + y > z, the current cryptosystem is vulnerable [201. Various academics [21],
government agencies [22], and international working groups [16] are concerned about
mitigating the threat to secure communication posed by quantum computers.
1.1.2 The quantum strikes back
Besides posing a threat to the secure Internet as we know it, quantum information
processing (QIP) offers a potential solution in the form of quantum key distribution
(QKD). QKD enables two pre-authenticated participants, traditionally known as Al-
ice and Bob, to establish secret, identical keys over long distances [23]. The output
keys have universally composable security [24], allowing them to be used as inputs to
classical encryption schemes such as the one-time pad (OTP) [25].
The OTP is a symmetric encryption scheme that offers information-theoretic secu-
rity, which does not require assumptions about an adversary's abilities and is therefore
not susceptible to any potential speedups provided by a quantum computer. The OTP
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requires the two users to hold identical and secret keys. To encrypt, each plaintext
bit is combined with a key bit by the exclusive-or (XOR) operation. The result-
ing ciphertext is decrypted by XOR-ing with the same key. Barring human factors
such as theft, loss, improper disposal, or reuse of the key, the OTP is provably (i.e.,
information-theoretically) secure [261. However, because the keys must be at least as
long as the plaintext, the challenging aspect of the OTP is secure key exchange. His-
torically, this restricted the use of the OTP to ultra-secure, low-bandwidth channels
[27]. QKD aims to solve the key exchange problem by enabling two geographically
separated users to establish a symmetric encryption key with security based on the
laws of physics.
A special feature of QKD is its ability to provide intrusion detection during the
key exchange process. Alice and Bob can detect the interference of an adversary,
traditionally known as Eve. Eve's interference can be quantified, and if it is beyond
an acceptable threshold, Alice and Bob will abort the protocol rather than use an
insecure key [231. However, a potential drawback of QKD is the requirement that
Alice and Bob have previously authenticated themselves to each other [281, which
necessitates that they hold a prior shared secret. For this reason, QKD is best un-
derstood as a tool to expand a short secret key to a much longer secret key, rather
than a tool to generate unconditionally secure keys from scratch [29]. Secure schemes
exist to establish authentication using a key much shorter than the messages to be
authenticated [301, and therefore, following a precedent set by two of the inventors of
QKD [29, 311, our work will assume that Alice and Bob are already authenticated.
However, QKD is not a security panacea: it obviates the mathematical complexity
assumptions currently required by common encryption schemes only to replace them
with a legion of new assumptions related to physical implementations [32, 33]. Despite
these new challenges, QKD is expected to become an increasingly valuable tool for
securing communications [34].
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1.2 High-dimensional quantum states
1.2.1 High-dimensional quantum information processing
In QKD, Alice sends quantum states to Bob. The quantum states are traditionally
carried by so-called flying qubits - photons. A qubit, or quantum bit, is a quantum
system that can be in one of two states. For photons, the states can be represented by
physical degrees of freedom, including but not limited to polarization, frequency, or
spatial mode. The first QKD protocols used qubits based on the polarization states
of photons [31, 35, 36].
High-dimensional (or large-alphabet) QIP aims to encode more than one bit of
information per photon by using photonic degrees of freedom with dimension d > 2.
Candidate degrees of freedom for qudits (the d-dimensional equivalent of a qubit)
include frequency, time, spatial mode, momentum, or orbital angular momentum
(OAM) mode. (Polarization is not a good candidate for qudits, as there are only
two orthogonal polarization states; however, it can be combined with other degrees
of freedom to produce hyperentangled states [37].)
Compared to qubit states, high-dimensional quantum states can provide practical
advantages for QIP in terms of resource usage, or task efficiency. For instance, high-
dimensional quantum states make it easier to violate Bell-like inequalities in tests
of local realism [38-42]. The state fidelity [40, 43] and detection efficiency [41, 441
required for violation are both lower for qudits compared to qubits. Working with d >
2 can also reduce the number of entangled photons required to collectively teleport the
state of multiple qubits [45]. Qudit states can also provide some efficiency advantages
over classical information processing. Brukner et al. proved that every Bell (or
high-dimensional Bell-like) inequality is associated with a communication complexity
problem, and states that violate the inequality can be used to solve the communication
problem more efficiently than any classical protocol could [46, 471.
High-dimensional QIP could also lead to more efficient quantum gates [481 or
quantum error correction [491. Qudit states are also interesting for use in quan-
tum metrology, as they could lead to improved sensitivity; for example, using high-
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dimensional OAM states could provide greater sensitivity (compared using to qubit
states) in angular resolution [50].
Most relevantly for this work, high-dimensional quantum states can potentially
have a large information content per photon [51, 52], and high-dimensional encoding
can provide higher resilience to loss and noise in QKD [53-551.
1.2.2 High-dimensional quantum key distribution
In high-dimensional (i.e., large-alphabet) QKD [56], Alice transmits qudits to Bob
to establish a key at a potentially higher rate than that afforded by traditional, two-
level QKD protocols. Because QKD is primarily motivated by the OTP 2, and because
OTP encryption consumes one key bit for each bit of plaintext, key generation rates
should ideally approach data communication rates. However, state-of-the-art QKD
systems have not yet demonstrated secret-key rates higher than Mbps [3, 59].
The first QKD protocols relied on binary encoding in discrete polarization states
[31, 35, 361, which could result in at most one bit of secure information per detected
photon. Since single photons of light are difficult to reliably produce and detect,
the motivation for large-alphabet QKD is to increase the information per detected
photon above the one-bit limit of binary QKD. Instead of polarization, there are a
variety of other candidate degrees of freedom. To date, studies of large-alphabet
QKD have investigated position-momentum in free-space [60-62], spatial modes in
multicore fibers [63, 64], time-energy [2, 4, 52, 65-761, and OAM modes [77-791.
1.2.3 High-dimensional time-energy entanglement
To implement QKD in today's telecommunications infrastructure, time-energy qu-
dits are particularly appealing because they are preserved when transmitted through
2 The QKD outputs can be used with any symmetric encryption protocol, including block ciphers
such as AES. Such schemes are not information-theoretically secure, but quantum computing is
expected to provide only a quadratic speedup in cracking block ciphers [571, making their continued
use more feasible than encryption schemes that rely on integer factorization or discrete logarithms.
Block ciphers benefit from frequent key refreshing, which is challenging classically but can be aided
by QKD [23]; indeed, QKD has been demonstrated in conjunction with real-time AES-256 encryption
with rekeying [58].
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single-mode optical fiber, which is not true for polarization, position-momentum,
or OAM modes. The time-energy correlations are also compatible with wavelength
division multiplexing (WDM) systems, which can potentially reduce infrastructure re-
quirements by combining several quantum and/or classical signals on the same optical
fiber.
Optical fiber has two low-loss spectral windows around 1310 nm and 1550 nm.
Advanced time-energy-entangled photon pair sources have been developed for both
windows using either spontaneous four-wave mixing [80-831 or spontaneous paramet-
ric downconversion (SPDC) [84-861. In this thesis, we focus on high-dimensional
time-energy entanglement produced by SPDC [871. SPDC is a nonlinear optical pro-
cess that converts a pump photon into two daughter photons (called signal and idler),
while conserving both energy and momentum. The signal and idler photons are corre-
lated in emission time and anticorrelated in frequency. SPDC can produce entangled
states with a very large number of dimensions, d, and thus a very high information
content, log 2 d bits, per photon [51, 521.
Time-energy entanglement can be verified using a Franson interferometer [88],
which comprises two unbalanced interferometers, one at Alice's location and one at
Bob's. The original Franson interferometer setup analyzes only two temporal modes,
but by increasing the number of interferometers, multiple temporal modes can be
measured [75, 89-91]. An alternative measurement strategy uses interferometers and
polarizing beamsplitters to convert timing information to polarization [43, 921. How-
ever, these methods measure discrete temporal modes defined by the interferometer
delays, and the setups become more complex as d gets larger.
Compared to these interferometric techniques, quasi-continuous measurements of
time and frequency can be simpler to implement, assuming the availability of more
specialized hardware with sufficiently high temporal and spectral resolution. The
continous degrees of freedom are discretized by the measurement resolution. Us-
ing fast single-photon detectors, time can be measured by direct detection, while
frequency can be measured by applying a frequency-dependent temporal shift, e.g.,
using dispersion [2, 73, 93]. Alternatively, frequency can be measured directly using
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a spectrometer, and timing information can be converted to frequency by applying
a time-dependent frequency shift, e.g., using a time lens [67, 94]. These continuous
measurements can access the large information bandwidth of time-energy-entangled
photons for QKD and other applications.
1.3 Field demonstrations of quantum key distribu-
tion
Two-dimensional QKD protocols have been demonstrated in long-distance testbeds
around the world in both atmospheric channels [95-102] and over deployed fibers
[7, 58, 103-1131. Many multi-node fiber network testbeds have also been established
for binary QKD [103, 106, 108-111], demonstrating long-term, stable operation and
integration with software systems that manage and use the output keys.
On the other hand, high-dimensional QKD experiments have generally been lim-
ited to in-lab demonstrations [4, 52, 60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 75, 78, 79], although a recent
field test combined two polarization modes and two OAM modes to produce four-
dimensional states for QKD over an atmospheric channel [114].
1.4 Outline of this thesis
In this thesis, we describe the first lab and field demonstrations of a recently devel-
oped high-dimensional QKD protocol based on time-energy entanglement. Our field
demonstration is in fact the first field demonstration of any high-dimensional QKD
protocol. In Chapter 2, we introduce essential background information on QKD se-
curity and provide context for different families of protocols. In particular, we define
and compare the entanglement-based (EB) and prepare-and-measure (P&M) imple-
mentations of QKD, both of which are investigated in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we
introduce our protocol, dispersive-optics QKD (DO-QKD), and also detail its security
analysis. The development of DO-QKD and its first security proof were led by Jacob
Mower, in collaboration with Zheshen Zhang and Prof. Jeffrey Shapiro. The first
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security proof holds in the asymptotic regime, when the output keys are assumed to
be infinitely long. This thesis extends the proof to the more realistic regime of finite-
length keys. The finite-key security proof for DO-QKD is also contained in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4, we describe the P&M implementation of DO-QKD and also introduce
the 42-km deployed-fiber testbed that runs between MIT in Cambridge, MA, and MIT
Lincoln Laboratory (LL) in Lexington, MA. All field demonstrations in this thesis
occurred in this testbed, in collaboration with the Optical Communications Technol-
ogy Group at LL. We present both lab and field demonstrations of P&M DO-QKD
and discuss the utility of high-dimensional time-energy encoding. In Chapter 5, we
present our work on the EB implementation of DO-QKD, including the construction
of SPDC sources, an in-lab demonstration in collaboration with the single-photon de-
tector groups from NIST Boulder and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and steps
toward a field demonstration in the testbed. We also include further discussion of the
trade-offs resulting from high-dimensional time-energy encoding. In Chapter 6, we
describe a high-dimensional Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen steering experiment that uses
the same setup as EB DO-QKD to confirm the presence and successful distribution of
entanglement. In Chapter 7, we summarize our contributions and present suggestions
for further work.
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Chapter 2
General background on quantum key
distribution
In this chapter, we describe some relevant background on QKD protocols and their
security. This material provides context for later chapters and will be subsequently
expanded upon as needed.
2.1 Goals, assumptions, and attack classifications
QKD enables two parties separated at a distance, traditionally called Alice and Bob,
to communicate securely with each other without requiring assumptions about the
resources available to an adversary, Eve1 . After the successful implementation of a
QKD protocol, Alice and Bob should hold keys that are identical and secret, i.e.,
known only to them. The most useful figure of merit of a QKD system is the secret-
key rate, i.e., the rate in bits per second at which Alice and Bob build up their secret
and identical keys. The secret-key rate is affected by all aspects of the physical system,
namely the transmitter, the receiver, and the channel, as well as by theoretical factors
such as the protocol choice.
Alice and Bob are connected by an insecure quantum channel and a public but
1In classical cryptography, Eve is merely an eavesdropper, and a malicious active attacker is
called Mallory [27], but in QKD, Mallory's attributes are given to Eve.
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authenticated classical channel. Eve is assumed to have full control over the quan-
tum channel, constrained only by the laws of physics, and all loss, noise, and other
non-idealities caused by this channel are attributed to Eve. However, Eve can only
eavesdrop on messages passed on the classical channel. The authentication of the
classical channel prevents Eve from staging a man-in-the-middle attack or otherwise
interfering with messages passed on this channel. She cannot alter or block messages
sent by Alice or Bob or inject her own messages. Additionally, Alice and Bob assume
that Eve cannot access their laboratories; that is, she cannot access their physical
setups and measurement settings [231.
Although Eve is, in theory, constrained only by the laws of physics, it is useful to
categorize her possible attacks, listed here from weakest to strongest [1151:
1. Individual attacks: Eve can only interact with Alice's transmitted signals one-
by-one, and she must make her measurements after Alice and Bob perform
sifting but before they begin their classical postprocessing.
2. Collective attacks: Eve can make a joint measurement over all of Alice's trans-
mitted photons, and she can make her measurement after Alice and Bob's clas-
sical postprocessing is complete, taking advantage of additional information
leaked over the classical channel during postprocessing.
3. Coherent, or general, attacks: Eve can do anything compatible with the laws of
physics.
It is proven for some cases that the security bounds against coherent attacks are
equivalent to to those for collective attacks [23, 115, 116].
2.2 Outline of a general protocol
All QKD protocols have two main stages: signal exchange and measurement, which
occurs over the quantum channel, followed by classical postprocessing, which is ac-
companied by messages sent over the classical channel.
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There are two main categories of QKD implementations that differ in the signal
exchange and measurement stage; they are known as the entanglement-based (EB)
and prepare-and-measure (P&M) implementations. EB and P&M implementations
are mathematically equivalent, making the same security proofs true for both types
[23, 36]. In an EB implementation, Alice produces an entangled-photon pair and
transmits half of it over the quantum channel to Bob; they subsequently measure their
respective halves of the pair to obtain correlated results. In a P&M implementation,
Alice prepares quantum states by encoding information in some photonic degree of
freedom and transmits the photon over the quantum channel to Bob, who measures
it to recover the information that Alice encoded. The classical postprocessing stage
is the same for both EB and P&M implementations.
In both implementations, Alice and Bob use (at least) two different, complemen-
tary bases for measurement and/or encoding. After the signal exchange and mea-
surement stage is complete, Alice and Bob compare their basis choices (but not their
measurement results) for each clock cycle. They discard instances for which they used
different bases. The remaining instances are translated into correlated strings of bits
(for two-dimensional protocols) or symbols (for high-dimensional protocols) - the
raw keys.
Alice and Bob's raw keys are highly likely to contain errors, so to fix this, Alice
and Bob run the raw keys through these classical postprocessing steps:
1. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob publicly compare a subset of their mea-
surement results to estimate relevant parameters of the quantum channel, such
as the error rate or detection rates. This subset must be randomly chosen. If
the value of any parameter is beyond some previously agreed-upon threshold,
Alice and Bob conclude that Eve's interference was too great to result in a
secure key, and they abort the protocol.
2. Error reconcilation: Alice and Bob use classical error correction to remove errors
from their raw keys. This step involves communication over the authenticated
classical channel and will leak information about the reconciled keys to Eve,
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even when using one-way communication to minimize the leakage.
3. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob remove Eve's information about their
reconciled keys by using hash functions to distill secret (but shorter) keys [117,
1181.
2.3 Comparison of entanglement-based and prepare-
and-measure implementations
Although EB and P&M implementations of QKD are mathematically equivalent [361,
they are markedly different in setup complexity and utility. Despite significant devel-
opment of SPDC sources, including efficient sources based on waveguides [84-86, 119],
it can be difficult to produce high-quality entangled pairs at high rates. On the other
hand, P&M QKD transmitters require no entanglement sources. P&M QKD has
been studied using single-photon sources based on quantum dots [120-125] or defect
centers in diamond [1261, but the most common light source for P&M QKD is an
attenuated laser.
In P&M QKD, Alice uses an attenuated laser to produce weak coherent pulses
(WCPs). When the phase of each WCP is random, the state p of Alice's laser output
can be described by a Poissonian mixture of number states with average intensity
(photon number per WCP) p [23]:
00
p = : P(n, p) In) (nI, (2.1)
n=O
with
P(n, p) = .(2.2)
n!
For QKD, only pulses with n = 1 are desired; n = 0 pulses are considered vacuum and
make no contribution to the key, and pulses with n > 1 are susceptible to the photon-
number-splitting (PNS) attack [127, 128]. In a PNS attack, Eve can detect whether
a WCP contains n > 1 photons and act accordingly: for n < 1, she simply prevents
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the pulse from reaching Bob, while for n > 2, she splits the pulse. By transmitting
at least one photon to Bob while keeping the rest of the pulse for herself, Eve obtains
a copy of the quantum state that Alice sent to Bob. Eve can then measure the state
without introducing errors that Alice and Bob can detect.
To guard against a PNS attack, Alice can transmit pulses of varying intensities.
Alice and Bob then record the received photon statistics separately for each intensity.
The fraction of Bob's received signals corresponding to a given intensity should match
the fraction of signals that Alice transmitted with that intensity. This strategy is the
so-called decoy-state method [129-131]. Without decoy states, Alice would have to
keep her average photon number p very low to reduce the likelihood of transmitting
multi-photon pulses. A low value of p reduces the single-photon transmission rate and,
consequently, the secret-key rate: Alice's optimal intensity scales as t and the secret-
key rate scales as t2 , where t is the transmission of the quantum channel connecting
Alice and Bob. However, by using decoy states, Alice can achieve the same scaling
obtained by single-photon sources: the secret-key rate is linear in t [23j. Decoy states
allow Alice to maintain the secret-key rates attainable by single-photon sources while
using a convenient and potentially low-cost laser.
One appeal of P&M QKD transmitters is that they can be built using commercial,
off-the-shelf (COTS) components, such as lasers, modulators, and attenuators. They
can also be constructed compactly and in large numbers using photonic integrated
circuits [113, 132, 1331. Additionally, since Alice only prepares quantum states but
does not detect them, she requires no single-photon detectors, which can be costly and
potentially require cumbersome cooling systems. However, Alice does need multiple
satisfactory sources of random numbers: one to generate the raw key, one to determine
the basis used for each signal, and one to determine the intensity transmitted for each
signal.
The most significant advantage of P&M QKD over EB QKD is that P&M trans-
mitters currently operate at significantly higher rates. Current state-of-the-art P&M
systems are clocked at or around 1 GHz [3, 59, 134j, while bright SPDC sources pro-
duce high-quality entangled pairs at low-MHz-class rates [86]. The highest-rate QKD
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demonstrations reported to date use P&M systems [3, 59, 76].
Despite the higher secret-key rates achieved by P&M systems, EB QKD is not
obsolete, and it has its own advantages. Only EB systems, in combination with the
violation of a Bell inequality [40, 135-1381, can be used for device-independent (DI)
QKD [139-1431 - a category of QKD schemes that aims to eliminate the requirement
for trust in the physical implementation of a system. There is a disconnect between
a theoretical QKD security proof and the physical implementation of a protocol,
which can lead to hardware-related vulnerabilities that are not covered by the theory
[32, 33]. In addition to DI QKD, another unique application of EB QKD relates
to long-distance transmission: only EB QKD is compatible with quantum repeaters
[1441, which could counter the effects of loss in the quantum channel and connect
users separated by ever-greater distances.
2.4 Two protocol families: discrete and continuous
variables
EB and P&M refer to two different types of QKD implementation. We would also
like to compare two different families of QKD protocols.
2.4.1 Discrete-variable quantum key distribution
As the name implies, discrete-variable QKD protocols encode information in discrete
degrees of freedom of single photons, such as polarization [7, 31, 96] or discrete phases
(measured by interferometers with fixed phase differences between the two arms)
[59]. In the first QKD protocol, known as BB84 [31], Alice encoded information in
discrete polarization states using two complementary bases. In one basis, the so-called
rectilinear basis, Alice can produce either an IH) state with horizontal polarization
or a IV) state with vertical polarization. In the other basis, the diagonal basis, Alice
can produce either a diagonal state ID) = (IH) + V))/v'2 or an antidiagonal state
A) = (IH) - IV))/x/h. Security was initially based on the intuition that if Eve
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were to disturb the states transmitted from Alice to Bob, then on average, she would
introduce noticeable errors, and meanwhile, the laws of physics prevent Eve from
simply copying the state [1451.
Over time, these intuitive notions of security became more formalized. Early se-
curity proofs were based on entanglement distillation and then also on its correspon-
dence with QKD postprocessing [146-1481. Later proofs are based on information-
theoretic techniques that bound the length of the secret key that can be extracted
[24, 115, 149, 1501. Discrete-variable protocols such as BB84 are proven secure against
coherent (the most general) attacks [115, 1501.
Discrete-variable procotols use single-photon detectors and postselect only suc-
cessful detection events, i.e., if a photon is lost, then it does not contribute to the key.
Thus, loss impacts the secret-key rate because it affects the rate of detection events;
however, loss does not directly lead to errors in the raw keys.
2.4.2 Continuous-variable quantum key distribution
Continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocols use standard homodyne or heterodyne re-
ceivers to detect the modulation of either squeezed or, more commonly, coherent
states of light. Depending on the modulation scheme, CV QKD protocols have the
potential to extract > 1 bit of information per received signal.
The receivers can be COTS and are generally faster than single-photon detectors.
However, instead of postselecting on successful detection events, the receiver makes
a measurement at each clock cycle, and losses in the channel contribute to noise
at the receiver. Compared to discrete-variable QKD, Alice and Bob might be able
to build up their raw key more quickly, but more intensive error reconciliation is
required. Additionally, in terms of secret-key rates, CV QKD protocols perform
worse at higher loss. The maximum tolerable loss, and thus attainable distance, of
CV QKD is currently lower than that of discrete-variable QKD.
It has been shown that Gaussian attacks are optimal for both individual [1511 and
collective [152, 153] attacks against CV-QKD. Ref. [154] establishes security against
coherent attacks for CV protocols that use squeezed states. For CV protocols that use
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coherent states, Ref. [1551 proves security against collective attacks and can be easily
extended to show security against coherent attacks. Quantum de Finetti theorems
can reduce coherent attacks to collective attacks [1161, but this approach does not
scale well outside the asymptotic limit.
2.5 Finite-key security
In the asymptotic limit, the keys are infinitely long, and Alice and Bob have an
infinite number of samples with which to estimate the required parameters such as
the error rate. This scenario is unattainable, and realistic security must consider the
effects of finite-length keys. The most significant modifications to the security proof
are due to the effects of statistical fluctations in the parameters to be estimated [156].
Alice and Bob need to optimize over Eve's possible attacks that are compatible with
the observed parameter values, i.e., they must use the worst-case parameter values,
considering the statistical fluctations.
It can be nontrivial to translate a security proof from the asymptotic limit to the
finite-key regime. Initial finite-key security proofs assumed only collective attacks
[157, 1581. For some common protocols such as BB84, the collective-attack security
proof could be immediately extended to hold against coherent attacks by taking
advantage of symmetries in those protocols [157, 159]. For other protocols, such as
all CV QKD protocols, it took a few more years to develop techniques for finite-key
security proofs against coherent attacks [154, 1551.
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Chapter 3
Dispersive-optics quantum key
distribution: protocol and security,
including finite-key security
In this chapter, we introduce and define dispersive-optics QKD (DO-QKD), a new
large-alphabet QKD protocol that uses time-energy encoding, and we prove its se-
curity against collective attacks in the finite-key regime [721. We will later use our
finite-key security proof to analyze the security of our DO-QKD experiments.
The work on the development of DO-QKD and its asymptotic security proof was
led by Jacob Mower [21; we briefly summarize the asymptotic security in Section 3.2
because it is the essential starting point for the subsequent work.
3.1 Protocol definition
3.1.1 Signal exchange and measurement
Alice holds an SPDC source that produces pairs of time-energy entangled photons.
The biphoton state produced by the SPDC source in the vicinity of time t = 0 can
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be approximated as
| (2h)-1/ 2  dt AdtB [(A+ tB) _ (tA - tB)21I)=(7Ochor ff tex 16a 2  cor
'I) j coh cor 3.1
x exp [ iw2(tA+tB) tAtB),
where goh is the coherence time of the SPDC pump field, and O-cor is the correlation
time between photons, which is set by the phase-matching bandwidth of the SPDC
source. ItAtB) - att(tA)Cit(tB)10), and t aB(tj) denotes the photon creation opera-
tor for Alice or Bob, respectively, at time tj. The largest possible alphabet size of
the protocol is determined by the Schmidt number K, i.e., the number of possible
information eigenstates in the system. This is approximately K - coh/(cor [52, 1601.
Time-energy entangled pairs produced by SPDC can easily achieve Schmidt numbers
in the thousands; for example, a source with a phase-matching bandwidth ~ 250
GHz [861 pumped by a continuous-wave (cw) laser with gcoh ~100 ns has a Schmidt
number K = 25, 000.
When Alice's SPDC source produces a photon pair, she keeps one photon and
sends the other into the quantum channel to Bob. Alice and Bob measure their
photons in the conjugate bases of time and frequency (energy). The time basis (TB)
corresponds to direct detection of photon arrival time; the frequency basis (FB) is
implemented by direct detection after group-velocity dispersion (GVD) is applied to
the photon. To Alice measures in the FB, she applies normal GVD to her photon.
When Bob measures in the FB, he applies anomalous GVD of magnitude equal to
that applied by Alice.
Alice and Bob use oppositely signed GVD because the photons produced by the
SPDC are correlated in arrival time but anticorrelated in frequency. If the entangled
photons whose state is described by Eq. (3.1) pass through dispersive media, then, in
the limit of long coherence time Ucoh, the correlation time -cor becomes
1
cor co2 c+ (J2,ALA + /2,BLB))(
\cor
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where 02,A (02,B) is the GVD introduced by Alice (Bob) over length LA (LB) [161J. If
we define /3L I 3 2,ALA +/ 3 2,BLB, then as /3L increases, the temporal correlation be-
tween Alice's and Bob's photons degrades. However, 'tor =cor if 3 2,ALA - -2,BLB.
Thus, if Alice and Bob both record photons in the FB, the original correlations be-
tween their photons can be recovered [2]. The use of GVD gives the protocol its
name, dispersive-optics QKD (DO-QKD).
In the rest of this thesis, we will use the notation
DA - - 2 2,ALA (3.3)A2
DB = - A2 /2,BLB, (3.4)
where A is the photon wavelength. We will also use D to indicate a quantity of
dispersion when not specifically referencing Alice or Bob. The units of DA, DB, and
D are ps/nm.
A schematic of the DO-QKD protocol, including the SPEC source and the basis
measurements, is shown in Fig. 3-1.
3.1.2 Classical postprocessing
After the signal exchange and measurement stage, Alice and Bob sift their time-tagged
data into symbols. Each symbol is a temporal frame comprising M slots of duration
T.It, where Tsit is limited by the timing resolution of the single-photon detectors.
The total duration of a symbol is M x T,1,t.
Using the authenticated classical channel, Alice and Bob communicate their basis
choices and keep only the results from symbols for which they each registered a single
detection event while using the same basis. Alice and Bob convert each of these
detection events into a log 2 M-bit symbol, based on the temporal position of the
event within the frame, i.e., which slot contained the detected photon. The resulting
lists of symbols are the raw keys.
Postprocessing converts the raw keys into secure keys that are identical and se-
cret. Alice and Bob first use classical error correction to reconcile the differences
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Figure 3-1: Schematic of the DO-QKD procotol. Alice holds the SPDC source. When
an entangled photon pair is produced, she keeps one photon and sends the other to Bob
using the quantum channel (QC). Alice and Bob have passive splitters that randomly
route each photon to one of the two measurements. If Alice measures in the TB (case 1),
then Bob's photon is projected into a temporal state. If Bob also measures in the TB, his
result is correlated with Alice's; otherwise, the measurement results are uncorrelated.
Similarly, if Alice measures in the FB (case 2), then Bob's photon is projected into a
frequency state. If Bob also measures in the FB, his result is again correlated with
Alice's; otherwise, the measurement results are uncorrelated. Alice and Bob are also
linked by an authenticated classical channel (CC) over which they communicate during
the classical postprocessing stage.
between their raw keys [1]. The resulting reconciled keys should be identical. Privacy
amplification removes information that Eve may hold about the reconciled keys. Pri-
vacy amplification is often implemented using 2-universal hash functions. A common
method is to multiply the reconciled keys by random Toeplitz matrices [118]. The
sifting and postprocessing steps are illustrated in Fig. 3-2.
3.2 Asymptotic security
The following security analysis quantifies the secure information shared using DO-
QKD, assuming that Eve can mount arbitrary collective attacks [2, 691 and that the
output keys are infinitely long. The analysis combines desirable aspects of discrete-
variable and CV QKD protocols. Like discrete-variable QKD, DO-QKD relies on the
detection of single photons. Losses reduce the rate of photon detection and thus of
key generation but do not add errors to the raw keys. This is preferable to the role
that loss plays in CV QKD, in which losses manifest themselves as noise in Bob's
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Figure 3-2: Sifting and classical postprocessing, illustrating one measurement basis. A
symbol is a temporal frame comprising M slots; in this illustration, M = 4. Sifting
converts Alice and Bob's measurement results into correlated raw keys with some errors.
Error correction is accomplished using a layered low-density parity check (LDPC) code
[11 and converts the raw keys to identical reconciled keys. Eve's information about the
reconciled keys is eliminated using privacy amplification, leaving Alice and Bob with
shorter but secret secure keys.
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measurements. However, using CV QKD, it is inherently possible to obtain more
than one secure bit per detected signal, while most discrete-variable QKD protocols
use binary encoding and are thus limited to one bit. This security proof for DO-QKD
adapts the Gaussian-state analysis of CV QKD [162, 1631 for single-photon QKD.
The secure photon information efficiency (PIE) quantifies Alice and Bob's infor-
mation advantage over Eve in units of bits per detected photon coincidence (bpc).
In the asymptotic regime, assuming collective attacks, the secure PIE is given by
[23, 164]
O= /I(A; B) - x(A; E), (3.5)
where 0 < /3 < 1 quantifies the efficiency of the error reconciliation and I(A; B) is
Alice and Bob's mutual information, i.e., the information shared after making their
correlated photon detection measurements. x(A; E) is the Holevo information, i.e.,
the maximum information that Eve can access about Alice and Bob's measurements,
assuming that she is limited to arbitrary collective attacks [152, 1531.
An upper bound on x(A; E) is computed using the covariance matrix of Alice and
Bob's TB and FB measurements. The time-frequency covariance matrix (TFCM) is
given by [2]
~ rl7AA - 7 B) (3.6)
(1 - 77)-YA (I -+ 07BB
where IF is a four-by-four matrix composed of four two-by-two submatrices. Each
submatrix 1JK for J, K = A, B describes the covariance between the measurements
of parties J and K. The submatrices are given by
(u+v u+v
YA A = 16 
8k
u+v (u+v)(4k2 +uv)
8k 4k2 uV
u-v u-v
T 16 8k
=A 'YBA
u-v 
_ (u-v)(4k2+UV)
8k 4k 2UV
u+v u+v
BB = (16 8k )
u+v (u+v)(4k2 +uv)
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where u 16u2 h, cor, and k 2D 12]. In IF, q represents the decrease in
correlations, and e represents the excess noise. These two parameters quantify the
effects of Eve's intrustion, channel noise, and setup imperfections.
Instead of directly measuring q and c, it is experimentally easier for Alice and Bob
to measure another parameter, (, the excess noise factor:
2 -(3.7)90
Here, 0 2 is the variance of the measured correlation between Alice and Bob's detected
photons, and o is the noiseless variance of that correlation (i.e., excluding Eve's
intrusion). Section 3.3.2 will explain that Alice and Bob only need to monitor the
excess noise factor in the FB, i.e., the excess spectral noise factor,
(7.2
= - 1. (3.8)
U2
Here, o.2J is the noiseless spectral correlation variance, which is determined by the
SPDC pump coherence time, 9coh, and the time-bandwidth product. u, is the mea-
sured spectral correlation variance between Alice and Bob's detected photons. Be-
cause the FB measurement converts frequency information to timing information, a-
is in practice derived from o-t, the two-photon correlation time after Alice and Bob
apply equal and opposite GVD of magnitude ID|, using the relationship (derived in
Appendix A)
or2 r 2 1D2o 2ot2 =for + ID 2.,(3.9)
where o-or is the two-photon correlation time measured in the TB. Thus, the two-
photon spectral correlation is given by
X/O t cor (3.10)|DI
Since a,- is inversely proportional to ID|, the precision of the frequency measurement
increases as the dispersion is increased.
45
The relationship between q, 6, and is then given by
-271(K K2 _ 1) +
= (3.11)
K 2 +
where K is the Schmidt number of the SPDC source (which defines the maximum
alphabet size). Using their estimate for , Alice and Bob choose values of q and E
that maximize the Holevo information while satisfying Eq. (3.11) and the following
conditions [21:
1. Eve cannot increase Alice and Bob's Shannon information by interacting with
only Bob's photons, due to the data processing inequality.
2. The symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix are greater than 1/2, sat-
isfying the Heisenberg uncertainty relation.
3. Eve can only degrade (and not improve) Alice and Bob's measured arrival-time
correlation.
The calculation of x(A; E) then follows from the symplectic decomposition of the
TFCM [2, 69].
3.3 Finite-key security
The security analysis presented thus far holds only in the asymptotic regime, when
the output keys are infinitely long. We now amend it to show more realistic security
in the finite-key regime. In practice, this amounts to subtracting correction terms
from the asymptotic secure PIE defined in Eq. (3.5) and updating the estimate of
the Holevo information. When the finite-key corrections are large compared to the
asymptotic secure PIE, then no secure key can be obtained.
The most significant cause of finite-key corrections is the statistical fluctuations
in the estimated parameters [156]. Finite-key security analysis provides an estimate
for the number of signals that Alice and Bob must exchange to estimate the excess
spectral noise factor with sufficient accuracy and attain a positive secure PIE.
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3.3.1 E. and revised secure photon information efficiency
Outside the asymptotic limit, a protocol cannot be completely secure but only E,-
secure, where E, is defined as the probability that the output key K differs from an
ideal key [156, 157]:
1
ES= |PKE - TK 0 PEfl- (3.12)
2
Here, PKE is the joint state between K and Eve's system, T K is the completely mixed
state on K, and PE is the state of Eve's system. Operationally, E, is the tolerated
failure probability of the entire protocol [156, 157, 165], where failure means that
at the conclusion of the protocol and unbeknownst to Alice and Bob, Eve holds
information about the output key.
The failure probability E, is the sum of the failure probabilities of each stage of
the protocol [156-158, 165, 166]:
E8 = EPA + &- + nPEEPE + EEC- (3-13)
Here, EPA is probability that privacy amplification fails, leaving Eve with some infor-
mation about Alice and Bob's secure keys. 7 is also related to privacy amplification;
it is the smoothing parameter for the smooth min-entropy, which characterizes the
amount of secure information that can be extracted using privacy amplification when
Eve can hold quantum information [1571. EEC is the probability that error correction
fails, leaving Alice and Bob with reconciled keys that are not identical. EPE is the
probability that parameter estimation fails, meaning that the real value of the param-
eter is outside the desired confidence interval, and nPE is the number of parameters
to be estimated. Failure of any stage of the protocol implies that Alice and Bob are
unaware that something has gone wrong [158].
The finite-key secure PIE for the DO-QKD protocol can then be written as [72,
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157-159, 165-1671:
ri 1 2
rN = n I3I(A; B) - X PE (A; E) - -log 2N n EEC
2 1 g(3.14)
-log 2  -(2log 2 M+3) )(2(2/.4)
n EPA n
Here, the expression 1 I(A; B)-xPE (A; E) is nearly identical to the asymptotic secure
PIE defined in Eq. (3.5), but the subscript EPE indicates that the calculation of the
Holevo information must now include the finite-key effects on parameter estimation.
N is the total number of photon coincidences detected by Alice and Bob, using any
combination of basis choices. The quantity n = p2N denotes the number of detection
events for which Alice and Bob both chose the TB, where p is the probability that
the TB is chosen. We assume that Alice and Bob use the same value of p, and we will
see that this value need not be 1/2. Lastly, M is the alphabet size of the protocol.
3.3.2 Asymmetric basis selection
The factor n/N in Eq. (3.14) reflects the fact that not all of Alice and Bob's detection
events contribute to key generation. In particular, the sifted keys comprise only
detection events for which Alice and Bob both used the same basis. The first QKD
protocols [31, 35, 168] assumed that Alice and Bob choose the two measurement
bases with equal probabilities, limiting the probability of a same-basis coincidence to
at most 50%. It was later suggested that the probability of a same-basis detection
could be increased asymptotically to 1 if Alice and Bob choose one measurement basis
with a probability p > 1/2 [169]. However, Eve can also derive an advantage from
this choice: if she knows the preferred basis, then by using only that basis, she can
eavesdrop while introducing fewer errors (compared to the case when p = 1/2). This
gives Eve a better chance of remaining undetected by Alice and Bob. To remove Eve's
advantage, Alice and Bob must further modify the protocol: they divide their same-
basis detection events according to the measurement basis used, and they estimate
parameters separately for each basis. Security is ensured because if Eve chooses to
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eavesdrop in the preferred basis, then she introduces more errors in the other basis
[1691.
Because the insertion loss of the GVD elements reduces the photon detection rate
in the FB, the preferred basis for DO-QKD is the TB. By monitoring the excess
spectral noise factor ,, Alice and Bob can bound Eve's information about the TB
measurements. We assume that all m = (1 -p) 2 N of the FB coincidences are used for
parameter estimation to obtain a value for ,. The value of m is significant because
it affects Alice and Bob's ability to estimate , with sufficient confidence.
3.3.3 Modified parameter estimation
Alice and Bob have only a finite number of samples with which to estimate ,, and it
is important to know how well their estimate represents the entire dataset. The value
of EPE defines a confidence interval for the estimate of ,. Within this confidence
interval, Alice and Bob must use the worst-case estimate of , to upper-bound the
Holevo information.
In a sifted symbol-frame, Alice and Bob's detected photon arrival times, TA and
TB, are jointly-Gaussian random variables. Assuming that the sequence of Alice and
Bob's measurements is statistically independent, the estimate for o', the measured
two-photon correlation time after applying GVD, denoted &', has a x2 distribution:
(m - 1) -X(1 - EPE, m - 1)- (3.15)
cor
According to Eq. (3.10), the necessary estimate of the two-photon spectral correlation,
&', is related to &' by a constant factor, so &' also follows a x2 distribution. Then
an upper bound on o', is given by [158J:
/2 b/2 s 1- E01WUB = W~ + -erf- (I - EPE) T7. (3.16)
This bound is valid for the confidence interval 1 - EPE. Then, the worst-case estimate
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for , within the confidence interval is
/2
_ 
w,UB -' U 1. (3.17) Sw,UB - 2U
WO
3.3.4 Numerical results
To ascertain whether DO-QKD can output secure keys in the finite-key regime, we
first compute the finite-key secure PIE and plot it for different alphabet sizes M E
{8, 16, 32, 64} as a function of N, the number of detected coincidences, in Fig. 3-
3, for E, = 10- [72]. An important figure of merit is the smallest N at which
Alice and Bob can obtain a useful amount of secure information. Fig. 3-3 shows
that this occurs around N _ 104 for the chosen parameter values. This value is
comparable to that obtained by traditional, discrete-variable QKD protocols, which
are generally able to extract a useful amount of secure information starting at N e
105 [23, 156, 157, 159, 165J, and orders of magnitude lower than that of CV QKD
protocols, which generally require N ? 108 [158, 170].
For all protocols, the inability to obtain secure key at lower N values is due to the
finite key length and its effect on Alice and Bob's parameter estimation. Statistical
fluctuations in the estimated values have the most deleterious effects on the finite-
key secure PIE [156, 159] because Alice and Bob must use the worst-case estimate
compatible with EPE for each parameter. As N gets smaller, the magnitude of the
statistical fluctuations increases and the worst-case estimate increasingly deviates
from the asymptotic value, lowering the secure PIE.
Fig. 3-4 plots the finite-key secure PIE as a function of channel length for M
8 and different values of N E {104,106,10 8, 1010, oo} [721. Besides illustrating the
deleterious effects of smaller N on the secure PIE, Fig. 3-4 also confirms that the
finite-key secure PIE, just like the asymptotic secure PIE [2], is unaffected by loss.
Fig. 3-4 also indicates that even assuming finite-key security, DO-QKD should reach
transmission distances > 200 km.
For each value of N, the value of p, the probability of choosing the TB, should
be determined numerically to maximize the secure PIE [165]. Fig. 3-5 plots the TB
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Figure 3-3: Plot of DO-QKD finite-key secure PIE in bpc, assuming that Alice and Bob
estimate &t = 1.l9cor, their detector timing jitter Tj = 2ocor/3, their system detection
efficiency is 93%, and their background count rate is 1 kcps. The security parameter
is E = 10-5 , the failure probability of the error correction is EEC = 1010, and the
reconciliation efficiency is # = 0.9. The average number of SPDC pairs per symbol-
frame is p = {0.119, 0.231, 0.411, 0.607} for M E {8, 16, 32, 64}, respectively. Relevant
parameters were chosen to match the asymptotic examples in Ref. [2].
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Figure 3-4: Finite-key secure PIE in bpc versus channel length for different N. Here,
M = 8, the channel loss is 0.2 dB/km, and all other parameters take the same values
as in Fig. 3-3 and Ref. [2]. From top to bottom: N = oc, N = 1010, N = 108, N - 106,
N - 104.
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selection probability p and compares the secure PIE using asymmetric basis selection
to the secure PIE using symmetric basis selection as functions of N for M = 8 [72].
p has an effect on the secure PIE through the factor n/N in Eq. (3.14). Choosing
p > 1/2 clearly boosts the secure PIE, which approaches its asymptotic value as
p -+ 1. In the symmetric case, where p = 1/2, Alice and Bob have on average
only N/2 coincidences that were measured in the same basis, and only the n = N/4
coincidences detected using the TB contributed to the key. When p = 1/2, the
maximum possible secure PIE, even for large N, reaches only 25% of the maximum,
asymptotic value. For all N that yield a positive secure PIE, it is optimal to choose
p > 1/2. However, the value of p does not change the minimum N required to obtain
a positive secure PIE.
3.3.5 Discussion
We have shown security against arbitrary collective attacks for DO-QKD in the finite-
key regime, and we can continue to use this security analysis for our experiments. For
the example parameters [2], Alice and Bob can reach > 90% of the asymptotic secure
PIE for an experimentally feasible number of detected coincidences, N a 107, and a
positive secure PIE is obtained after detecting as few as N ? 104 coincidences.
These threshold values of N are on par with the finite-key performance of discrete-
variable QKD [23, 156, 157, 159, 165]. In contrast, CV QKD protocols require more
measurements; for realistic parameter values, secure information is not obtained until
N e 108 [158, 1701. At zero loss, assuming collective attacks, some CV protocols
can achieve a positive secure PIE starting at N = 106, but the threshold N increases
rapidly as the loss increases; at 25% loss, N > 108 is required [154].
Although DO-QKD adapts the covariance matrix-based security analysis of Gaus-
sian CV QKD protocols, treating time and frequency as discretized continuous vari-
ables to obtain a secure PIE > 1 bpc, its performance under finite-key constraints
more closely resembles that of discrete-variable QKD. This is because DO-QKD re-
lies on postselecting detected photon coincidences and thus does not suffer from loss-
induced noise like CV QKD. Most importantly, the secure PIE of DO-QKD is not
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Figure 3-5: Numerically optimized value of p = probability of choosing the TB assuming
asymmetric basis selection (solid blue curve), for M = 8, alongside a comparison of the
secure PIE in bpc assuming asymmetric basis selection using this p (dashed red curve)
and symmetric basis selection (dash-dotted green curve). For all N, the secure-key
capacity is maximized by choosing p > 1/2. Using symmetric basis selection, the secure
PIE is limited to 25% of the asymptotic value.
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degraded by loss, even in the finite-key regime. This finite-key analysis further high-
lights the advantages of combining CV and single-photon QKD.
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Chapter 4
Prepare-and-measure dispersive
optics quantum key distribution
In this chapter, we describe the P&M implementation of DO-QKD, the MIT-LL
deployed-fiber testbed, and demonstrations of P&M DO-QKD both in the lab and
over the deployed fiber. Our demonstrations achieved record secret-key rates for each
channel loss tested [76].
4.1 Motivation
High-dimensional encoding is possible in a variety of degrees of freedom, and large-
alphabet QKD has been demonstrated in the laboratory using position-momentum
[62], spatial modes in multicore fibers [63, 641, time-energy [4, 52, 65, 67, 71, 751, and
OAM modes [77-79j. Of these, time-energy encoding is appealing for its compatibil-
ity with existing telecommunications infrastructure - which lowers the barriers to
widespread adoption of QKD. The time-energy correlations are robust over transmis-
sion in both fiber and free-space channels and are preserved in the presence of WDM
systems.
In high-dimensional temporal encoding, the position of a photon within a tempo-
ral frame comprising M time slots can convey as much as log 2 M bits of information,
as depicted in Fig. 4-1(a). Classically, this encoding is known as pulse position mod-
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ulation (PPM), and combined with single-photon detection, it achieves near-optimal
performance in terms of bits per detected photon [1711. Assuming a constant slot
duration, PPM exhibits a trade-off between the alphabet size M and the transmitted
symbol rate: an increase in the former directly corresponds to a decrease in the lat-
ter. The alphabet size determines how much information is encoded in each photon,
and the transmitted symbol rate directly impacts how many photons are received per
second. We take advantage of this trade-off to maximize the secret-key rate in the
presence of receiver saturation.
Fig. 4-1(b) is a representative plot of secret-key rate versus channel length for
binary encoding with realizable parameters. Three regimes of distance/loss are indi-
cated. In normal operation (Region II), the secret-key rate decreases exponentially
with distance until the received photon flux is comparable to the background counts
of the detector(s). At distances/ losses beyond this cutoff point (Region III), the corre-
lations between sender and receiver are masked by the background and the secret-key
rate drops abruptly. However, at short distances, i.e., low losses (Region I), the
secret-key rate is limited when some component of the receiver hardware - such as
the detectors or the readout electronics - is saturated by the incoming photon flux,
as illustrated in Fig. 4-1(b). In this regime, which extends to approximately 100 km
for these parameters, the best strategy to maximize the secret-key rate is to reduce
the transmitted photon rate by increasing the alphabet size until the receiver is just
below saturation. Although much research has focused on extending the range of
QKD links well beyond 100 km [8, 134, 172, 1731, shorter links should not be ignored
- even at distances ~ 40 km, secret-key rates lag behind classical data communica-
tion rates by orders of magnitude [3, 59]. Futhermore, deployed QKD networks will
include a variety of link lengths with potentially different optimal technologies; thus,
we focus here on using high-dimensional encoding to maximize secret-key rates over
metropolitan-area distances of tens of kilometers.
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Figure 4-1: (a) In high-dimensional temporal encoding (pulse position modulation),
information is encoded in the position of an optical pulse within M slots, depicted here
for alphabet size M e {2, 4, 8, 16}. For a fixed slot duration, the alphabet size and the
transmitted pulse rate are inversely proportional. (b) Representative plot of secret-key
rate versus channel length for a traditional two-dimensional QKD protocol, assuming a
5 symbols/second modulation rate, a 0.2 dB/km channel loss, a 1 kcps background count
rate, a 93% detector efficiency, and a 100 ns detector reset time after each detection
event. Three regions are denoted: I. At short distances, 0-100 km (or correspondingly,
low losses, 0-20 dB), the secret-key rate is limited by detector saturation. 1I. For higher
losses (normal operation), the secret-key rate decays exponentially with distance. III.
At even higher losses (> 300 km), a cutoff is reached when Bob's received photon rate
becomes comparable to his detectors' background count rate. The error rate grows and
the secret-key rate drops abruptly.
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4.2 Prepare-and-measure implementation
In the P&M implementation of DO-QKD, Alice holds a broadband light source, such
as a superluminescent diode (SLD), and filters it to the order of 0.1 nm of spectral
bandwidth. Alice uses PPM, a programmable pulse pattern generator (PPG), and an
electro-optic modulator (EOM) to encode a data pattern that will become the raw
key. To transmit in the TB, Alice sends the PPM signal to Bob, and in the FB, she
applies GVD to the signal before sending it to Bob. Alice should use a random basis
for each transmitted symbol, or more specifically, the basis choice for each symbol
must appear random to Eve, and Alice must also record which basis was used for
each symbol. In EB QKD, the basis choice is often indicated by which detector
fired, making it easy to glean which-basis information from Alice's or Bob's recorded
measurements. In P&M DO-QKD, Alice could select a basis for each symbol using
active optical switches that deterministically route a pulse through GVD in one arm
or, in the other arm, a variable optical attenuator (VOA) to match the insertion loss
of the GVD element. After the two arms are recombined, Alice applies extra GVD
to precompensate for the dispersion incurred over the fiber channel, and she uses
another VOA to keep the average number of photons below one per pulse.
Bob makes the same TB or FB measurements as in the EB DO-QKD protocol;
his random basis choices can be implemented using a passive splitter. The essential
components of the P&M DO-QKD transmitter and receiver are shown in Fig. 4-2.
Alice's second VOA is operated at multiple preset levels of attenuation, corre-
sponding to different intensities for the signal state, which is used for generating
secure key, and one or more weaker decoy states, which are used for channel moni-
toring to guard against PNS attacks [130, 131, 174-176]. As with the basis choice,
Alice's intensity for each transmitted symbol should appear random to Eve, and Alice
must record which intensity was used for each symbol.
To aid the sifting, Alice can also transmit a synchronization signal to Bob. An
auxiliary ouput of the PPG is used to drive another EOM that carves the cw output
of a laser diode into periodic sync pulses. At Bob's receiver, the pulses are detected
60
...........
Alice
To Bob
Bob 2 SLD: superluminescent diode
o o LD: Ilaser diode
BPF: bandpass filter
PPG: pulse pattern generator
From Alice tEOM: electro-optic modulatorND: normal dispersion
* AD: anomalous dispersion
-- - VOA: variable optical attenuator
DCM: dispersion compensating module
Figure 4-2: Schematic of the P&M DO-QKD protocol. Alice's light source is a filtered
SLD; she uses an EOM driven by a programmable PPG to encode the raw key. Active
optical switches allow Alice to deterministically route the signal to one of two arms that
implement the basis choice: in the upper arm (FB), GVD is applied, and in the lower
arm (TB), the signal is attenuated to match the insertion loss of the GVD element.
Alice precompensates for the dispersion in the channel and attenuates the signal to
the appropriate intensity for either signal or decoy pulses before transmitting it to
Bob. Alice uses a second modulator and an auxiliary output of the PPG to produce
periodic synchronization pulses that are also transmitted to Bob. Bob detects the
synchronization pulses classically, and he detects the quantum signals using the same
measurement setup as in the EB DO-QKD protocol. Thin, solid lines indicate optical
connections, and thick, dashed lines indicate electrical connections.
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classically using a linear-mode avalanche photodiode (APD). The sync signal is used
to determine the symbol and slot edges during sifting, i.e., when Bob demodulates
the PPM signal.
The experiments described here are only a proof of principle because Alice's setup
differed from an ideal P&M QKD transmitter in several important aspects:
" The raw key data encoded by Alice must come from a trusted source of random
numbers; however, we deterministically encoded a repeating pattern of symbols
to simplify the PPM demodulation.
* Alice's basis choice for each frame must also come from a trusted source of
random numbers (she is allowed to use asymmetric basis switching), and she
must know which basis was used for each transmitted frame (for example, us-
ing active optical switches, as depicted in Fig. 4-2); however, we used manual
basis switching: Alice and Bob used the same basis for an entire dataset, and
we combined datasets to perform the key generation and the security checks,
because of constraints in the available hardware and the added complexity of
the driving and time-tagging electronics.
" Alice's choice of photon intensity, i.e., her choice whether to transmit a signal
or a decoy state, must also come from a trusted source of random numbers,
and she must know which intensity was used for each transmitted frame (for
example, using a programmable VOA or by inserting another EOM to control
the intensity of the cw light that reaches the PPM-encoding EOM); however, we
used manual decoy states: Alice used the same intensity for an entire dataset,
and we combined datasets to perform the key generation and the security checks,
again because of constraints in the available hardware and the added complexity
of the driving and time-tagging electronics.
We emphasize that these experimental simplifications relate to problems of classical
engineering and do not detract from the quantum aspects of this work. A dedicated
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) could have simplified the sifting and clock
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recovery; however, we chose to work with available COTS time-taggers (Picoquant
HydraHarp 400) and perform as many postprocessing tasks as possible using soft-
ware. Similarly, a custom FPGA could have aided with implementing and tracking
Alice's random data/basis/intensity choices; however, we chose to work with a COTS
PPG, which provided a mechanism for Alice to drive but not easily track her ran-
dom outputs. Additionally, at the time of the experiments, only one optical input
to a detector array was available. There are precedents for deterministic raw key
encoding, manual basis switching and manual decoy states in early proof-of-principle
demonstrations of other QKD protocols [177, 1781.
4.2.1 Security proof modifications
In EB DO-QKD, Alice and Bob estimate o-,, the two-photon spectral correlation [71J,
by measuring the timing correlations between their photons measured in the FB. For
P&M DO-QKD, we use an alternate formulation of ,. It is more experimentally
relevant to measure how well the GVD applied to a PPM pulse is cancelled in the
FB, and thus, we want to minimize c' = o.2 - a2, where again o- represents the
two-photon spectral correlation width including Eve's effects, and 6r, is the noiseless
spectral correlation. To clarify, the measured o', is related to the increase in the two-
photon spectral correlation width, and not to the width itself. Keeping the definition
of , from Eq. (3.8), we can rewrite , in terms of the experimentally measured o'
as
0_W12(4.1)
wo
We can use the same finite-key analysis presented in Section 3.3.3 to obtain worst-case
estimates for o' and .
Finally, the secure PIE is revised. Since only Bob detects photons, no photon
coincidences are recorded; thus, the units of the secure PIE become bits per detected
photon (bit/photon), or simply bits. Decoy-state analysis must be added to the
calculation of the secure PIE [175]. In the asymptotic regime, the secure PIE including
63
decoy-state analysis is
roo,decoy -(A; B) ( FLB) 102 M - F BxUB (A; E), (4.2)
where FLB is a lower bound on the fraction of Bob's detection events that came from a
single-photon transmission by Alice and XUB(A; E) is an upper bound on the Holevo
information. Decoy-state measurements contribute to the estimation of FLB and
xUB(A; E). In the finite-key regime, we must also consider the effects of a finite sample
size on the estimation of the parameters related to decoy states [1761, in addition to
the penalty terms from Eq. (3.14) and the impact on the Holevo information.
4.3 Deployed-fiber testbed
For field tests of this and other quantum networking applications, we have established
a 42-km deployed-fiber testbed in collaboration with LL. The testbed comprises two
strands of dark (i.e., carrying no other light) fiber running in parallel between the
main campus of MIT in Cambridge, MA, and LL in Lexington, MA, as approximately
illustrated in Fig. 4-3. Compared to the same length of fiber on a spool in the lab,
installed fibers have higher losses due to large numbers of splices and bends.
The loss can be measured using a laser and an optical power meter, but greater
information is given by an optical time domain reflectometer (OTDR). OTDRs trans-
mit pulses and measure and time the backscattered power to determine the location
and loss of splices in an optical fiber. An OTDR measurement requires access to only
one end of the fiber, making it a convenient tool for characterizing deployed fibers.
Fig. 4-4 shows a representative OTDR trace of one of the deployed fibers, as measured
from the LL end.
The loss over the deployed fiber fluctuates from day to day. For a quasi-long-term
measurement of the round-trip loss, the output of a cw laser was split at LL; half
of the power was monitored by a local power meter while the other half traversed
down one of the dark fibers to MIT, through a short jumper, and back to LL over
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Figure 4-3: Illustration of the MIT-LL deployed-fiber testbed. Locations of MIT and
LL are accurate, but the fiber path is an artistic rendering.
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Figure 4-4: Representative OTDR trace from LL to campus. The x-axis shows distance
in feet; the y-axis shows relative backscattered power in dB. The slope of the trace
indicates the loss of the fiber without splices; discontinuities and/or spikes indicate
large losses and/or backreflections that are characteristic of splices. Around 110,000
feet, there appears to be a gain in the fiber; this is most likely due to a patch of
non-standard (probably dispersion-shifted) fiber that is part of the link.
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the other dark fiber, where it was measured with a power meter. The difference
between the readings from the two power meters, recorded over four days in August
2014, is plotted in Fig. 4-5. Large swings of about 0.1 dB appear on weekdays but
not on weekends. Some of the observed fluctuations could be related to polarization
drifts over the fiber and polarization-dependent loss at the power meter. The cause
of the long-term average drift toward lower loss is currently unknown. Besides small-
scale fluctuations like those shown in Fig. 4-5, the one-way loss varies on the order
of one dB from day to day, over months and years. One-way loss measurements are
conducted by measuring the power of a cw laser at one end of the fiber (usually at
MIT), sending the light over the deployed fiber, and measuring the received power
at the other end (usually at LL). The power meters on either end of the fiber may
not be identically calibrated, but the observed variation in loss is too large to be
solely attributed to calibration differences or the non-repeatability of connecting two
FC/PC fiber connectors. At the time of the demonstration reported in this chapter,
the measured loss was 12.7 dB - equivalent to 63.5 km of standard single-mode fiber
on a spool (assuming standard loss of 0.2 dB/km). In December 2016, one of the
fibers broke; after it was repaired, the loss increased to - 16 dB.
For DO-QKD, we are particularly interested in the dispersion of the deployed
fiber. The dispersion incurred over the fiber channel must be properly compensated
(or at least quantified), or the security analysis of the protocol would be affected. To
characterize the one-way dispersion, the output of a pulsed laser was transmitted over
the fiber from MIT to LL. At LL, the received power was first amplified by an erbium-
doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) and then split; the pulses in each arm were passed
through a bandpass filter with a tunable center wavelength before being detected
classically by a photodiode. The center wavelength of one bandpass filter was fixed
while the other was swept through the wavelength region of interest (approx. 1559-
1563 nm). The relative delay between the detected pulses was recorded using an
oscilloscope. This delay is plotted as a function of the center wavelength of the swept
filter in Fig. 4-6. The quantity of interest, the GVD induced by the deployed fiber, is
the slope of the delay-vs.-wavelength line, and its value is 693 ps/nm.
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Figure 4-6: One-way dispersion over the deployed fiber, measured by recording the
delay experienced by pulses transmitted from MIT to LL. The size of the error bars was
determined by the uncertainty in reading the delay from the oscilloscope. The quantity
of interest is the slope of the linear fit, 693 ps/nm.
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An arguably more precise method to characterize chromatic dispersion in optical
fibers is by measuring the phase shift experienced by a sinusoidally modulated cw laser
as its wavelength is tuned [179, 1801. However, this method requires simultaneous
access to both ends of the fiber, which the deployed fiber does not allow. This method
was used to characterize the 41-km fiber spool that was used to test the P&M DO-
QKD system; the measured dispersion was 685 ps/nm.
4.4 Results
We implemented a proof-of-principle demonstration of P&M DO-QKD. All compo-
nents of Alice's and Bob's setups, apart from Bob's single-photon detectors, were
commercially available. Bob's single-photon detectors were niobium nitride (NbN)
superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) capable of counting at
hundreds of Mcps rates, with timing resolution of tens of picoseconds and few kcps
dark count rates [181]. Bob had access to four NbN nanowires that are interleaved
in a circular array and illuminated by a single optical fiber. Because the entire quad
of nanowires has only one optical input, the quad is effectively one detector. The
effective effiency of this single detector was 68%. With only one detector, Bob could
not easily measure in both the TB and the FB during the same data acquisition in-
terval, so Bob retained the same basis for the duration of each interval (on the order
of 1-10s of minutes, depending on the received photon flux). However, although the
quad has only a single optical input, each of the nanowires in the quad has its own RF
output, each of which is timetagged using a Picoquant Hydraharp with 1 ps timing
resolution. The four nanowires do not have the same timing jitter, so the sifting and
security checks for each nanowire were processed separately in software.
Just as Bob used a single basis for an entire data acquisition interval, Alice also
used a single basis, as well as a single intensity, for an entire interval. Alice transmitted
signal pulses with average intensity p = 0.5 photons per pulse and decoy pulses with
average intensity v = p/10 = 0.05 photons per pulse. The pulses were - 50 ps
FWHM, as verified using a classical photodiode. The light source was an SLD filtered
70
to 0.2 nm (25 GHz). The pulses were produced using a lithium niobate EOM driven
by a programmable PPG (Anritsu MP1763B). The 50-ps pulses were centered in slots
of duration 240 ps. M slots comprised a symbol, with M E {4, 8,16, 32}. Between
each M-slot symbol, an additional two guard slots were included to act as buffers.
Different datasets corresponding to Alice's and Bob's different choices of intensity
and basis were combined using software. Numerical optimization (implementated in
MATLAB) determined the effective fraction of time for each person to use each basis
and intensity to maximize the secret-key rate. The finite-key security parameter used
in the optimization was E, = 10-10, which is the standard value chosen in several
other experiments [8, 59, 112, 1131.
To implement the FB measurements, custom GVD elements with +10, 000 ps/nm
of dispersion were manufactured by Proximion AB. The operating principle is based
on chirped fiber Bragg gratings (FBGs) that introduce wavelength-dependent time
delays. Compared to the length of standard single-mode fiber required to effect the
same magnitude of dispersion (588 km A 17 ps/nm/km and 0.2 dB/km), the insertion
loss of these FBG-based elements is significantly lower (< 4 dB).
The P&M DO-QKD system was tested with three different channel configurations:
1. Alice and Bob were both located at LL, connected by a short patch cable with
negligible loss (the "back-to-back" configuration).
2. Alice and Bob were both located at LL, connected by a 41-km spool of standard
single-mode fiber with 7.6 dB loss. Alice's transmitter included a spool of
dispersion-compensating fiber (DCF) to precompensate for the GVD of the 41-
km spool.
3. Alice was located at MIT and Bob was located at LL. They were connected by
the 42-km deployed fiber, which, on the day of the demonstration, was measured
to have 12.7 dB loss. Alice's transmitter again included the same spool of DCF
to precompensate for the GVD of the deployed fiber. The quantum signals were
transmitted over the strand of dark fiber with lower loss, and the periodic sync
pulses were transmitted over the other strand to eliminate crosstalk between
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Back-to-Back 41-km spQol 42-km deployed fiber
Loss (dB) 0.1 7.6 12.7
Optimal M 16 8 4
Max. secret-key rate (bps) 23 x 106 5.4 x 106 1.2 x 106
Secure PIE (bit/photon):
Nanowire 1 1.46 0.82 0.41
Nanowire 2 1.33 0.79 0.35
Nanowire 3 1.42 0.96 0.60
Nanowire 4 1.37 0.94 0.61
Table 4.1: Summary of the maximum secret-key rates obtained in the three test cases.
the sync and quantum signals.
Table 4.1 summarizes the three test cases. Our results exemplify the rate trade-off
inherent to P&M high-dimensional time-energy QKD (and to PPM): for a fixed slot
duration, a larger alphabet size M increases the potential secure PIE but decreases
Alice's transmitted photon rate. The optimal M to maximize the secret-key rate
is a function of Bob's receivable photon rate. Fig. 4-7 displays the secret-key rates
obtained for each alphabet size M in the three test cases. The optimal M decreases
as loss increases.
We note that in the deployed-fiber case, our measurements alone do not confirm
whether M > 2 gives a higher secret-key rate than M = 2. We did not test the
case when M = 2 because DO-QKD is not optimal when M = 2. The secure PIE
presented in Eq. (4.2) holds only against the class of collective attacks, whereas tra-
ditional, two-dimensional protocols such BB84 [31] have proven security against the
most general, coherent attacks [591. Furthermore, Eq. (4.2) tends to yield a lower
secure PIE than that afforded by BB84. Ref. [59], the highest-rate BB84 demon-
stration for which secure PIE data is available, obtained 0.26 bit/photon with 10 dB
channel loss. At the same loss, a numerical simulation shows that P&M DO-QKD
with M = 2 achieves a secure PIE of 0.16 bit/photon. The numerical simulation uses
the measured parameters (e.g., Alice and Bob's timing correlations, detector timing
jitter) of the deployed-fiber test case. Over the deployed fiber with 12.7 dB loss,
DO-QKD with M = 2 should achieve a secret-key rate of 605 kbps, indicating that
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Figure 4-7: Experimental secret-key rates for all measured alphabet sizes of each test
case. Loss increases from left to right. The optimal M decreases as loss increases.
For experimental convenience, we did not increase the alphabet size once it became
apparent that doing so would not increase the secret-key rate.
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Figure 4-8: Experimental (stars) and theoretical (dashed curves) secret-key rates versus
channel loss. Colors correspond to optimal alphabet size M for each of the three test
configurations. Each theoretical curve uses a different set of experimental parameters
(e.g., detector timing jitter) that corresponds to each of the test configurations: Config
1 = Back-to-back; config. 2 = 41-km spool; config. 3 = 42-km deployed fiber.
increasing M provides a boost in the secret-key rate.
Results from the same numerical simulation, using the alphabet sizes and mea-
sured parameters corresponding to the maximum secret-key rate from each test con-
figuration, are plotted in Fig. 4-8, along with the experimental secret-key rates. The
reported values and theoretical curves include decoy state and finite-key analysis with
sample size N = 109 counts and security parameter 6, = 10-10 [72, 176]. The colors
in Fig. 4-8 correspond to alphabet size and thus to test configuration, since each con-
figuration had a different optimal alphabet size. The theoretical curves should not be
directly compared to each other because they are based on different experimentally
measured values. The theoretical curves are included to show that the numerical
simulation behaves qualitatively as expected as a function of channel loss.
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4.5 Discussion
The optimal M to maximize the secret-key rate depends most strongly on Bob's
received photon rate, which is in turn a function of channel loss. If Bob had an
infinitely fast receiver, the highest secret-key rate would be obtained for the fastest
transmitter rate, which occurs for M = 2. However, Bob's receiver hardware is
usually rate-limited. The limit may be due to the single-photon detectors themselves;
for instance, SNSPDs exhibit reset times ranging from a few nanoseconds [181-184]
to several tens of nanoseconds [184-1861, depending on the choice of superconductor.
The detector readout electronics can also limit the receiver count rate, as is the case
for the commercial time-tagger in our system, which has a dead time of 80 ns per
channel, and also for the high-rate BB84 demonstration of Ref. [3].
When Bob's receivable photon rate is limited, increasing M > 2 allows Alice and
Bob to effectively produce secret keys even during the dead time. Thus, at short
distances and correspondingly low losses, we can expect a bottleneck due to the
maximum count rate of Bob's receiver.
Our results in Table 4.1 confirm that increased loss between Alice and Bob is
correlated with a decrease in the alphabet size that produced the highest secure key
rate. Considering the representative plot in Fig. 4-1(b), we expect that at short sep-
arations, say from 0-75 km, and correspondingly low losses, 0-15 dB, Bob's detectors
are likely to become saturated, meaning that P&M DO-QKD could be particularly
advantageous for high-rate QKD on shorter links, on the scale of metropolitan-area
networks. Slower receivers would derive greater benefits from the high-dimensional
protocol, as saturation would occur at lower incoming photon rates. Fig. 4-9 com-
pares our results to some notable previously published QKD experiments, and we see
that P&M DO-QKD currently outperforms the other systems in this low-loss regime.
Additionally, the 1.2 Mbps secure key rate over the deployed fiber is the highest
rate reported in a QKD field test to date. Table 4.2 compares this result to other tests
over installed fibers with similar losses [112, 1871. However, we note that Refs. [112,
187] feature real-time postprocessing, while our system performs postprocessing in
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Figure 4-9: Comparison of our P&M DO-QKD results to previously published QKD
system records, chosen to represent either secure throughput or distance records for a
variety of protocols. BB84/T12: secure throughput record for two-dimensional QKD
[3]. HD-QKD: secure throughput record for high-dimensional entanglement-based QKD[4]. MDI-QKD: secure throughput record for measurement-device-independent QKD
[5]. CV/GMCS: distance record for continuous-variable QKD [6]. BBM92: secure
throughput record for two-dimensional entanglement-based QKD [7]. COW: distance
record for QKD [8].
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Ref. [187] Ref. [112] This work
Distance (km) 45 45 42
Loss (dB) 14.5 14.5 12.7
Secret-key rate (bps) 0.208 x 106 0.301 x 106 1.26 x 106
Secret-key rate normalized 0.586 x 106 0.848 x 106 2.35 x 106
to 10 dB loss (bps)
Table 4.2: Comparison of our P&M DO-QKD results to previously published QKD field
tests over installed fibers of similar length. Both comparison works used BB84.
software.
The high-dimensional time-energy encoding demonstrated by P&M DO-QKD of-
fers the ability to optimize the secret-key rate by varying the alphabet size M in
response to both receiver capabilities and channel loss. This is most advantageous
when Bob's receiver is saturated, which can often occur over metropolitan-area dis-
tances of tens of kilometers. By presenting and demonstrating a protocol intended
to adapt to the constraints of a particular link implementation, this work represents
a new approach to high-rate secure quantum communication optimized for use in
metropolitan areas.
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Chapter 5
Entanglement-based dispersive optics
quantum key distribution
In this chapter, we describe the implementation of EB DO-QKD, including the con-
struction of SPDC source(s), an in-laboratory experiment that is the first demon-
stration of a high-dimensional QKD protocol with security against arbitrary collec-
tive attacks, and steps toward demonstrating EB DO-QKD over the deployed-fiber
testbed.
5.1 Spontaneous parametric downconversion source(s)
For completely non-scientific reasons, two different SPDC sources were built: the
first on campus and the second at LL. The sources are functionally the same; they
are based on similar though non-identical type-II quasi-phased-matched periodically
poled potassium titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) waveguides fabricated by AdvR, Inc.
The waveguides are designed to convert pump light around 780 nm to orthogonally
polarized signal and idler photons at approximately 1560 nm, conserving energy. The
signal and idler wavelengths can be tuned over a few nanometers by adjusting the
pump wavelength, and because the fabrication is not uniform, different waveguides
on the same chip exhibit downconversion over slightly different wavelength ranges.
However, in contrast to other SPDC sources, such as those based on periodically
79
poled lithium niobate (PPLN), temperature tuning has negligible effect on the phase-
matching of these type-II quasi-phased-matched waveguides in PPKTP. As a result,
for a given waveguide, the wavelength at which the signal and idler are degenerate
cannot be shifted.
In both source setups, the pump, signal, and idler beams are free-space coupled
into and out of the waveguide. The primary differences relate to separating the pump
beam from the daughter photons and splitting the orthogonally polarized signal and
idler beams.
5.1.1 Campus source setup
A schematic of the campus SPDC source setup is shown in Fig. 5-1. A half-wave
plate (HWP) placed before the PPKTP waveguide input rotates the polarization of
the pump beam before the pump is coupled into the waveguide. After the waveguide
output, a dichroic mirror reflects most (but not all) of the pump beam while trans-
mitting the signal and idler. Subsequent extinction of the pump is done by dielectric
mirrors that have > 99% reflectivity over telecom wavelengths but do not reflect the
780 nm pump. Any higher-order waveguide modes are removed from the SPDC out-
put beam by a 10 nm bandpass filter (BPF) 186]. The orthogonally polarized signal
and idler photons are coupled into the same polarization maintaining (PM) single-
mode fiber, which also filters out higher-order spatial modes. The fast and slow axes
of the PM fiber are aligned with the signal and idler polarizations, respectively. The
signal and idler are then separated using a fiber-based polarizing beamsplitter (PBS).
The phase-matching bandwidth of this source is 200 GHz.
Fig. 5-2 plots detected single and coincidence count rates as a function of the
pump power measured in free-space before the PPKTP waveguide. The detectors
used with the campus source were tungsten silicide (WSi) SNSPDs loaned as part
of a collaboration with NIST and JPL. The WSi detectors had system detection
efficiencies > 85%, full width at half maximum (FWHM) timing jitters Ti ~ 80 -
120 ps, background count rates on the order of 1 - 10 kHz, and maximum count rates
on the order of 1 MHz (values varied based on the specific detector channel). As
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Figure 5-1: Diagram of the campus SPDC source setup. A HWP rotates the pump
polarization before the PPTKP waveguide. A second HWP is placed after the waveguide
for fine polarization adjustment of the orthogonally polarized signal and idler photons,
to maximize the extinction when they are separated by a fiber-based PBS. The pump
is extinguished by a combination of dichroic and dielectric mirrors, and the signal and
idler photons are coupled into the same PM fiber. Thin, black lines indicate fiber
connections; blue lines indicate free-space transmission of the pump beam, and red
lines indicate free space transmission of the signal/idler beams.
the photon count rate increases, the observed timing jitter also increases. Fig. 5-2
shows detectable count rates approaching 9 MHz, but because the timing resolution
is degraded at high rates, it is better to constrain to the photon rate to < 5 MHz.
5.1.2 Lincoln source setup
The SPDC source at LL was built after the one on campus, and the experience of using
the campus source motivated some modifications in the LL setup. A schematic of the
LL SPDC source setup is shown in Fig. 5-3. In contrast to the campus setup, the pump
side of the LL setup has a quarter-wave plate (QWP) in additional to a HWP. The
QWP converts an elliptical polarization to a linear one. It was not needed on campus
because the pump source and SPDC setup were directly adjacent to each other, but
it is helpful at LL, where one of the pump sources (futher described in Section 5.1.3)
is located on a different optical table and connected to the SPDC source by 15 m of
non-PM fiber. To separate the pump from the signal and idler beams, the dichroic
mirror from the campus setup is replaced by two identical longpass filters (LPFs) that
have both greater extinction of the pump and higher transmission of the outputs.
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Figure 5-2: Singles and coincidence count rates as functions of pump power for the
campus SPDC source, detected using WSi SNSPDs. The discrepancy in the singles
rates should be attributed to suboptimal free-space to fiber coupling of both modes and
extra loss in the fiber connection to the "signal" detector channel.
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Figure 5-3: Diagram of the LL SPDC source setup. A QWP and a HWP adjust the
pump polarization before the PPTKP waveguide. The pump is blocked by two identical
LPFs. A second HWP and QWP are placed after the waveguide for fine polarization
adjustment of the orthogonally polarized signal and idler photons, to maximize the
extinction when they are separated by a free-space PBS before being coupled into
separate PM fibers. A linear polarizer on the output of the reflected port of the PBS
improves the polarization extinction. Thin, black lines indicate fiber connections; blue
lines indicate free-space transmission of the pump beam, and red lines indicate free
space transmission of the signal/idler beams.
The LPFs are followed by a HWP and QWP for fine-tuning of the polarization and
then the same 10 nm BPF for cleaning up higher-order spatial modes. A free-space
PBS separates the signal and idler with greater extinction than the fiber-based PBS
from the campus setup, and a linear polarizer provides additional suppression of the
unwanted polarization at the reflected output of the PBS. The signal and idler photons
are coupled into separate PM fibers. The fiber coupling can be optimized individually
for each of the signal and idler beams to maximize the detected coincidence rate. The
phase-matching bandwidth of this source is 375 GHz.
Fig. 5-4 plots detected single and coincidence count rates as a function of the
pump power measured in free-space before the PPKTP waveguide. The pump was a
cw laser, and the detectors were quads of NbN SNSPDs, as described in Section 4.4.
However, only two nanowires from each quad were connected to the timetagger (ef-
fectively reducing the detection efficiency of each quad by 1/2).
5.1.3 Pulsed pump source(s)
Both SPDC source setups require a fiber-coupled 780 nm pump. For alignment and
characterization, we typically use a fiber-coupled tunable cw laser, but some DO-QKD
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Figure 5-4: Singles and coincidence count rates as functions of pump power for the LL
SPDC source, detected using NbN SNSPD quads.
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experiments call for pump pulses with FWHM duration - 1-10 ns. On campus, this
was accomplished by using a lithium niobate (LiNbO 3) EOM to carve the 780-nm
cw light into pulses of the desired duration. However, the average output power was
only ~ 3 mW. This was partially due to the low pulse duty cycle (- 1% for this
experiment), which we could have changed, but the other constraints on the output
power came from the EOM's high insertion loss and the susceptibility of LiNbO 3 to
photofractive damage at wavelengths < 1 Atm. Additionally, the EOM's low extinction
ratio (- 10 dB, measured indirectly by detecting the downconverted photons) meant
that the EOM did not sufficiently block the laser when the pump should have been
"off."
At LL, we were able to take advantage of existing hardware to improve the pump
pulse extinction ratio and increase the average output power. The full setup of the
improved pulsed pump source is illustrated in Fig. 5-5. An arbitrary waveform gen-
erator (AWG) was used to produce RF Gaussian pulses at a higher repetition rate
(31.25 MHz). These RF pulses were amplified and used to drive a telecom-band
LiNbO 3 EOM that was in all ways superior to the short-wavelength one: thanks to
significant investment in research and development motivated by the telecom indus-
try, COTS LiNbO 3 EOMs are available at telecom wavelengths with high extinction
and low insertion loss. The pulses thusly produced at 1560 nm were first amplified
by two stages of EDFAs to an average power > 3 W and then upconverted by second
harmonic generation (SHG) in a bulk PPLN crystal to produce Gaussian pulses with
high extinction at 780 nm. The measured SHG conversion efficiency was 5 %/W.
The average in-fiber power of the SHG pulses exceeded 20 mW; this power was sub-
sequently attenuated as desired to pump the SPDC source. The PPLN setup was
previously designed, built, and aligned by Ben Dixon, Ryan Murphy, and Margaret
Pavlovich; it happened to be sitting in the lab unused, and thus we were able to
quickly incorporate it into the SPDC system with only some minor adjustments.
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EOM: electro-optic modulator
EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier
BPF: bandpass filter
0 FC: fiber coupling
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Figure 5-5: Diagram of pulsed SHG source. Gaussian RF pulses produced by an AWG
are used to drive a lithium niobate EOM, producing Gaussian optical pulses at 1560 nm.
The telecom pulses are amplified by two cascaded EDFAs, with a BPF between the first
and second stages to elimate unwanted amplified spontaneous emission. After being
launched into free space and passing through another BPF, the average optical power
is > 3 W. A QWP and HWP adjust the telecom pump polarization before the bulk
PPLN crystal. After the PPLN, the telecom and SHG are separated by a DM, and
after polarization adjustment by a HWP and QWP, the SHG is coupled into fiber. A
fiber-based VOA controls the SHG power that is sent to the SPDC source. Thick,
dashed lines indicate electrical connections; thin, black lines indicate fiber connections;
red lines indicate free space transmission at 1560 nm; and blue lines indicate free-space
transmission at 780 nm.
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Figure 5-6: Experimental setup for the EB DO-QKD demonstration with Alice and
Bob located in the same lab, which allows them to share a single timetagger. The
SPDC source is simplified in this illustration. Thin, solid lines indicate optical connec-
tions; thick, dashed lines indicate electrical connections; blue lines indicate free-space
transmission of the pump beam; and red lines indicate free space transmission of the
signal/idler beams.
5.2 Lab demonstration of entanglement-based dispersive-
optics quantum key distribution
The in-lab demonstration of EB DO-QKD occurred on campus using the campus
SPDC source and the NIST/JPL WSi SNSPDs. The photon detection efficiency from
source to detector was 3.3% and 0.77% for Alice and Bob, respectively, including
all coupling losses. Fig. 5-6 shows a schematic of the EB DO-QKD setup for this
demonstration. Whenever Alice and Bob are located in the same lab, they can share
a single timetagger, which provides a convenient shared clock for sifting.
5.2.1 Basis transformations using group velocity dispersion
In spite of the advantages of asymmetric basis switching (discussed in Section 3.3.2),
Alice and Bob used 50-50 splitters to switch between the two measurement bases
because that was what was available. The FB measurements were implemented using
COTS devices based on chirped FBGs (manufactured by Teraxion). The operating
principle is the same as that of the Proximion devices described in Section 4.4, but
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unlike those devices, the Teraxion devices used in this demonstration apply GVD
that is periodic over 50-GHz (0.4 nm) spectral channels matched to the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) grid, i.e., instead of being continuous over the spec-
tral width of the signal and idler photons, the group delay resets every 0.4 nm. The
magnitude of the applied group delay slope is IDI = 600 ps/0.4 nm.
Fig. 5-7 plots photon coincidences recorded between Alice and Bob's four possible
combinations of measurements in the TB and FB, with the SPDC source pumped by
a cw laser. If Alice and Bob both record photons in the TB, their photons have cor-
related arrival times within - 110 ps FWHM. This correlation width is dominated by
the timing jitter of Alice and Bob's detectors and time-tagging electronics; the corre-
lation time of this SPDC source, as determined by the phase-matching bandwidth, is
2.8 ps. If Alice and Bob measure in different bases, the correlation width is broadened
to - 630 ps, as expected for these GVD elements. Since the dispersion-broadened
photon temporal envelope exceeds the ~ 100 ps timing resolution of the SNSPDs,
precise spectral measurements can be made [93]. Lastly, if Alice and Bob both record
photons in the FB, they recover a narrow correlation width of 140 ps, exemplifying
nonlocal dispersion cancellation [161]. The mismatch between the correlation widths
measured with and without dispersion is an input to the excess spectral noise factor,
,, as described in Section 3.2.
5.2.2 Results
For this EB demonstration, the SPDC source was pumped with pulses with duration
1.49 ns FWHM. This value corresponds to a baseline (i.e., without Eve's interference)
frequency correlation of awO = 125 MHz (standard deviation) between Alice and Bob's
photons. The nonlocal dispersion cancellation of the FB measurements allowed Alice
and Bob to- resolve frequency correlations to a, = 273 MHz, giving them an excess
spectral noise factor ( = 3.74. Using this ,, the Holevo information was bounded
to x(A; E) = 1.56 bpc, including finite-key corrections with security parameter e, =
10-5.
The maximum reconciled information was 3I(A; B) = 2.39 bpc, obtained for
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Figure 5-7: Measured two-photon correlations for all combinations of Alice's and Bob's
measurement basis choices. When both Alice and Bob use the TB, the measured cor-
relations are limited by SNSPD timing jitter. When only one party uses the FB, the
measured correlations are broadened to a duration determined by the applied GVD.
When both Alice and Bob use the FB, narrow timing correlations are recovered.
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M = 64. Errors in the raw keys were reconciled using a multi-layer low-density
parity-check (LDPC) code that was specifically designed for high-dimensional QKD
applications [1]. The code performs efficient large-alphabet error correction from the
least significant to the most significant bit. It is particularly effective at correcting
errors caused by timing jitter, which comprise the vast majority of errors in the raw
keys. The efficiency # of the error correction code is defined as
mutual information reconciled by code (5.1)
I(A; B)
where I(A; B) is the mutual information of Alice and Bob's raw keys. The maximum
possible mutual information is log 2 M, but in practice I(A; B) is lowered by the effects
of detector timing jitter, background counts, and multipair emissions from the SPDC
source. Fig. 5-8 plots / obtained by this code as a function of the symbol error rate
(SER) for different alphabet sizes M E {16, 32, 64,128, 256, 512} and a large number
of datasets produced by the campus SPDC source.
Finally, to eliminate Eve's information about the reconciled keys, privacy ampli-
fication was implemented using hash functions based on multiplication by random
Toeplitz matrices [1181. Privacy amplification shortens a reconciled key that is n
symbols long to a secure key that is r < n symbols long, where the ratio r/n is given
by
r secure PIE (5.2)
n log 2 M
5.2.3 Discussion
In this demonstration, the maximum observed secret-key rate was 456 bps, and the
corresponding secure PIE was 0.83 bpc. The sample size was N - 3 x 105 counts,
which is relatively small: the secure PIE was only ~ 80% of its asymptotic value.
The penalty due to finite key lengths, AFK, was 0.20 bpc. With only an order-of-
magnitude increase in N, we can more than halve the finite-key correction to 0.07
bpc, and when N > 10', AFK < 0.01 bpc. We can easily increase N, and thus, the
secure PIE, by using a longer integration time and/or asymmetric basis selection.
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Figure 5-8: Reconciliation efficiency / obtained by the layered LDPC error reconcilia-
tion code [1], plotted as a function of the symbol error rate (SER) of the raw keys, for
alphabet sizes M E {16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512}.
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Another way to raise the secret-key rate is to increase the pump pulse rate while
maintaining the SPDC pair generation rate per pulse, i.e., while keeping the peak
power constant. In this demonstration, the average SPDC pair generation rate was
0.28 pairs/pulse, and the pump pulse repetition rate was 8.3 MHz. The pulse duty
cycle was low, ~ 1%, which leaves substantial room for improvement in the repetition
rate.
An alternate strategy is to increase the average entangled pair generation rate by
increasing the pump power. However, this also increases the likelihood of producing
multiple entangled pairs by a single pulse or during the same symbol. This is similar
to the trade-off Alice experiences in P&M QKD when determining the optimal average
photon number p of her attenuated laser transmitter: higher intensities increase
her transmission rate but also increase the risk of multi-photon emissions that are
susceptible to PNS attacks. The decoy-state method was developed to counter this
trade-off [129-131j. Decoy states are also helpful in EB QKD because some security
proofs assume a single photon pair is emitted per symbol or per pump pulse [69, 73,
175]. However, there is another issue related to multi-pair emissions that decoy states
do not solve.
Multi-pair emissions tend to reduce Alice and Bob's mutual information because
independent pairs, even if produced during the same pump pulse, are not correlated
with each other. Suppose two photon pairs are produced by a single pulse and that
Alice and Bob each detect only one photon, but their detected photons come from
different pairs. Then, the sifting algorithm would interpret these detection events as
a photon coincidence, but the detected arrival times would be uncorrelated. To ex-
emplify this effect, Fig. 5-9 plots the raw and reconciled mutual information (I(A; B)
and /I(A; B)) for M = 256 as functions of the pump power (or equivalently, the
entangled pair generation rate per slot). Higher pair generation rates correspond
to lower mutual information per photon coincidence. (The data in Fig. 5-9 were
recorded using a cw pump for the SPDC source, but the same relationship between
pump power and mutual information holds for pulsed pumping.)
The multi-pair emission rate can also be affected by the alphabet size. Photon
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Figure 5-10: Predicted raw mutual information and experimentally obtained raw and
reconciled mutual information (I(A; B) and /I(A; B)) for fixed pump power as functions
of log2 M.
pairs emitted during the same symbol, which has duration M x T1 t, are classified
as multi-pairs. For a fixed average pair generation rate per slot, the likelihood of
multi-pair emissions increases as M increases. Although a larger alphabet size leads
to a larger theoretical maximum mutual information, in practice the mutual infor-
mation does not increase indefinitely as M increases. This effect is illustrated in
Fig. 5-10, which plots the predicted, raw, and reconciled mutual information as func-
tions of log 2 M. The predicted mutual information was computed using a numerical
model that considers the effects of multi-pair emissions, loss, background counts, and
detector timing jitter on the mutual information.
Finally, there is yet another trade-off to consider, and that is the same one depicted
in Fig. 4-1(a): for a fixed slot duration, a larger M leads to a smaller rate of symbols
per second.
In summary, higher pump powers lead to higher entangled pair generation rates
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Figure 5-11: Reconciled mutual information rate in bits per second as functions of both
the pump power and the alphabet size.
(and thus to higher detected coincidence rates) but also reduce the secure PIE due
to the effects of multi-pair emissions on the mutual information. A larger M raises
the maximum possible secure PIE, but as M increases, multi-pair emissions eventu-
ally cause the secure PIE to decrease, assuming a fixed slot duration. Continuing
this assumption, a larger M also corresponds to a lower rate of symbols per sec-
ond. Fig. 5-11 plots Alice and Bob's reconciled mutual information rate in bits per
second as functions of both the pump power and the alphabet size, showing that
both pump power and M should not be increased indefinitely if the goal is to obtain
higher communication rates. Thus, several experimental parameters can and should
be optimized for each use scenario, considering channel loss, receivable photon rates,
etc.
We can improve upon this EB DO-QKD demonstration by optimizing these pa-
rameters, adding asymmetric basis switching, improving the source-to-detector cou-
pling, and/or updating the pulsed pump source. Most of these strategies affect the
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mutual information or the detected coincidence rate, but an as-yet unmentioned ap-
proach is targeted at reducing the Holevo information: by increasing D, the mag-
nitude of the GVD. This increases Alice and Bob's spectral resolution. For the
same observed value of o, increasing D reduces the corresponding value of or,
which in turn reduces &. With this motivation, the Proximion GVD elements, with
ID = 10, 000 ps/nm, were purchased after the completion of the lab demonstration
described in this section, to be used for DO-QKD experiments in the deployed-fiber
testbed (including the P&M experiments described in Chapter 4, which chronologi-
cally occurred after this demonstration).
5.3 Toward entanglement-based dispersive-optics quan-
tum key distribution over deployed fiber
For EB DO-QKD experiments in the deployed-fiber testbed, we use the LL SPDC
source. Alice and the SPDC source are located at LL. The detectors at LL are four
quads of NbN SNSPDs, as described in Section 4.4. (Some time after the demon-
stration of P&M DO-QKD, three additional quads became available.) Not all of the
quads have four operational nanowires, but this is not a huge concern because we are
also constrained by the number of available timetagging channels. The efficiency per
nanowire is between 13-17%, and FWHM timing jitters range from 58-90 ps. Bob is
located at MIT. Detectors at MIT are more (different) WSi SNSPDS with detection
efficiencies between 65-70% and FWHM timing jitters ranging from 200-290 ps.
5.3.1 Timing synchronization over deployed fiber
There are two significant challenges to counting coincidences between MIT and LL
over the deployed fiber. First, it goes without saying (but we'll say it anyway),
that when Alice and Bob are located on different ends of the deployed fiber, they
can no longer share a timetagger. Instead, Alice and Bob each have a Picoquant
Hydraharp. To obtain any useful timing correlations, the two Hydraharps require a
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shared frequency reference.
Fig. 5-12 displays results from the first photon coincidence counting measurements
over the deployed fiber. The acquisition time was ten seconds for each trial. These
initial experiments used a type-0 bulk PPLN SPDC source built by Ben Dixon (since
these experiments happened before the LL PPKTP source was built). The upper
plot of Fig. 5-12 shows an example of the cross-correlation between signal photons
detected at LL and idler photons detected on campus without any shared frequency
reference. No dispersion compensation was used; since the signal and idler spectral
widths are 13 nm, the expected temporal broadening due to fiber dispersion is 9 ns.
However, the correlation peak width is on the order of microseconds, which exceeds
the expected width by three orders of magnitude, even when accounting for dispersion.
Additionally, the signal-to-noise ratio is very low (or more accurately, the background
is unusually high).
In a subsequent test, we optically transmitted a 10 MHz reference signal (using
a laser diode and an EOM) from LL to campus to synchronize the frequency ref-
erences of the two Hydraharps. The lower plot of Fig. 5-12 shows an example of
the cross-correlation between signal photons detected at LL and idler photons de-
tected on campus in the presence of this optically shared frequency reference. Both
the correlation peak width and the signal-to-noise ratio are the expected order of
magnitude.
To maintain a permanent shared frequency reference between LL and campus,
identical COTS global positioning system (GPS) receivers were installed at both lo-
cations. Each receiver uses timing signals acquired from GPS satellites to discipline an
on-board oscillator that in turn drives several reference outputs, including a 10 MHz
sine wave. The GPS-derived 10 MHz signals provide frequency references for both
Hydraharps. Alice also connects the 10 MHz reference signal to the AWG in SPDC
pulsed pump source and to a PPG that outputs periodic pulses. Just as in the P&M
DO-QKD experiments, Alice uses the PPG and an EOM to modulate the cw out-
put of a laser diode to produce periodic sync pulses that can be transmitted over
the fiber to Bob. Alice also electrically connects the PPG output to her Hydraharp.
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Figure 5-12: Upper: cross-correlation between signal photons detected at LL and idler
photons detected on campus without a shared frequency reference between the two
timetaggers. Lower: the same cross-correlation when a 10 MHz frequency reference
was optically transmitted over the fiber to synchronize the two timetaggers; all other
aspects of the measurement were the same. For each plot, the acquisition time was 10 s.
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Figure 5-13: Experimental setup for the EB DO-QKD demonstration when using the
deployed fiber, including the GPS systems and associated frequency reference connec-
tions. The SPDC source is simplified in this illustration. Thin, solid lines indicate
optical connections; thick, dashed lines indicate electrical connections; blue lines in-
dicate free-space transmission of the pump beam; and red lines indicate free space
transmission of the signal/idler beams.
Fig. 5-13 shows a schematic of the EB DO-QKD setup when using the deployed fiber,
including the GPS systems and associated frequency reference connections. Alice pre-
compensates for the dispersion of the deployed fiber using a FBG-based dispersion
compensating module (DCM); it was recently obtained from Proximion AB and has
lower insertion loss than the spool of DCF mentioned in Section 4.4.
The other challenge to coincidence counting over the deployed fiber comes from the
fiber itself. Since it is outside the controllable laboratory environment, it is subject to
large temperature changes that can cause its effective round-trip length to change by
over ten meters in a single day (albeit a day when the outside temperature changed
by several tens of degrees Farenheit) [188]. Cross-correlations between photons de-
tected at LL and on campus over intervals of thirty minutes show large drifts of the
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Figure 5-14: Solid curve, left y-axis: temporal location of the peak in the cross-
correlation between signal photons detected at LL and idler photons detected on cam-
pus, as measured over 30 mins with the cross-correlation computed once per second.
Dashed curve, right y-axis: corresponding rate of change of the peak location.
coincidence peak in time. Fig. 5-14 is a representative plot that marks the location
of the cross-correlation peak, as well as the rate of change of the peak location, over
a thirty-minute acquisition period, when the cross-correlation is computed for each
second's worth of data (offline, not in real time).
The peak drift data plotted in Fig. 5-14 show a swing of nearly 80 ns in < 30 min-
utes. The equivalent length of fiber is ~ 16 m. Although length changes > 10 m have
been observed, they usually occur in the presence of large temperature changes over
many hours. In contrast, the data in Fig. 5-14 are representative of all of our thirty-
minute coincidence counting measurements on a summer day: each thirty-minute
integration period showed a swing of several 10s of ns. Using the same photon de-
tection events, Fig. 5-15 plots the cross-correlation for the full 30-min period. Values
on the x-axis of Fig. 5-15 correspond to values on the left y-axis of Fig. 5-14. In
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Figure 5-15: Cross-correlation between signal photons detected at LL and idler photons
detected on campus for 30 mins with timetaggers synced using GPS-based frequency
references.
Fig. 5-15, multiple discrete narrow peaks appear. Based on prior characterization of
the fiber link, we expect temperature-induced timing changes to manifest themselves
as slow, continuous drifts. Thus, we might expect Fig. 5-15 to contain a single, wide
peak corresponding to a continuous change in the deployed fiber length. However,
one possible explanation for the discrete peaks seen in Fig. 5-15 is that the rate of
fiber drift is not constant, going up to as much as 1 ns/s, as shown on the right y-axis
of Fig. 5-14. The times at which no narrow peaks appear in Fig. 5-15 are correlated
with high rates of fiber drift. This implies that when the fiber length is changing
rapidly, the coincidence rate at a given t is too low to contribute to a statistically
significant cross-correlation peak.
Despite this data, we remain unconvinced that length changes > 10 m are truly
occurring so rapidly and so frequently. The cause of our skepticism is the fact that
GPS-disciplined oscillators provide synchronization only to the order of nanoseconds.
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Fig. 5-12 clearly indicates that it is better to have the GPS-based 10 MHz refer-
ences than to not have them; they reduce the frequency difference between the two
timetaggers by several orders of magnitude. A concrete futher step to investigate the
remaining frequency mismatch is to test atomic frequency references at either end of
the deployed fiber.
5.3.2 Nonlocal dispersion cancellation over deployed fiber
We cannot estimate the temporal and spectral correlations between Alice's and Bob's
detected photons without correcting for the temporal drift of the cross-correlation
peak. We need to be able to isolate the correlation peak widths from any artificial
broadening or narrowing due to timing drifts. For the current detected coincidence
rates (on the order of 100 Hz) and the observed temporal drift, the path length
difference between Alice and Bob is not sufficiently stable to acquire enough samples
to estimate parameters and minimize the finite-key deductions in the secure PIE.
Although the cause of the observed temporal drift is not yet verified, we can use the
out-of-band sync pulses to reclock the detected photon arrival times at both Alice's
and Bob's timetaggers. Fig. 5-16 plots the timing correlations for all combinations
of basis choices after reclocking. The plots in Fig. 5-16 were produced using the
full thirty minutes' worth of data and stand in stark contrast to Fig. 5-15, which
corresponds to the Alice TB, Bob TB case without reclocking.
Using the reclocked timetags, we obtain , ~ 740 and x(A; E) > 5 bpc, which
is too high to obtain any positive secure PIE. The GVD is not sufficiently cancelled
between the TB and FB measurements. Comparing the widths of the correlation
peaks in Fig. 5-16, aA = 0o - -/ = 104 ps, even when deconvolving out the
effects of unequal detector timing jitters (differing by 90 ps FWHM).
Local measurements of dispersion cancellation at LL obtain UA = 30 ps, corre-
sponding to , ~ 10 and x(A; E) ~ 2 bpc. The target value of aA is on the order
of 1 ps. Part of the high -a can be attributed to the fact that the Proximion GVD
elements do not produce group delays that are flat across their - 4 nm passbands.
Instead, they each have a group delay ripple with magnitude - 65 ps/nm2 . The rip-
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Figure 5-16: Two-photon correlations measured over the deployed fiber for all combi-
nations of Alice's and Bob's measurement basis choices. Blue = measured data; red
Gaussian fits to data. The plots were produced using photon detection events acquired
for 30 mins; the detection events were reclocked using the periodic sync pulses recorded
by each of Alice's and Bob's timetaggers. In the Alice TB, Bob FB plot, the sharp
cutoff around 5 ns appears because the passband of Bob's GVD element cuts off part of
the idler spectrum. In the Alice TB, Bob TB and Alice FB, Bob FB plots, the auxiliary
peaks around 2 ns appear as an artifact of the reclocking, due to afterpulsing in the
periodic sync signal. This can be removed with updates to the algorithm.
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M SER I(A; B)
2 0.0557 0.691
4 0.1420 1.270
8 0.2649 1.613
16 0.3429 2.052
32 0.4079 2.515
Table 5.1: Raw key results for reclocked photon detection events measured over the
deployed fiber.
ple contributes to mismatch in the normal and anomalous GVD applied by Alice and
Bob. By filtering the signal and idler, we reduce the spectral width over which the
GVD ripple has an effect. After filtering to around 0.5 nm FWHM, with the filters'
center wavelengths set to maximize the detected coincidence rate, aA is reduced to
22.7 ps, which exceeds the target value by an order of magnitude but is also less than
one-fourth of the value obtained over the deployed fiber. Further work should con-
tinue to investigate whether the fiber, the timetaggers, or the reclocking are affecting
the measured timing correlation widths and oa.
5.3.3 Mutual information over deployed fiber
Table 5.1 summarizes the raw key results obtained using the reclocked photon de-
tection events. The reported values of I(A; B) were computed directly from the raw
keys and do not include error reconciliation. With these results, no secure PIE is
obtained.
5.3.4 Further work
To obtain a positive secure PIE over the deployed fiber, we need to improve the
nonlocal cancellation of GVD to reduce '. This could be aided by filtering the signal
and idler photons, at the expense of the coincidence rate, or by using a programmable
waveshaper to implement a custom group delay to offset the ripple in the Proximion
elements. We could even replace our GVD elements with ones that have a larger
value of ID1, which allows us to tolerate a larger temporal mismatch in the GVD
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cancellation. We also need to ascertain whether the GPS-based frequency references
are affecting the timing correlations between the photons detected by Alice and Bob.
An alternate strategy to combat fiber drift is to integrate the DO-QKD setup with
the LL fiber stabilization system described in Ref. [188]. The LL system can achieve
sub-wavelength stabilization of the round-trip fiber length. With some modifica-
tions, it should be adaptable for one-way stabilization. However, in its current state,
the stabilization system introduces an overwhelming amount of spontaneous Raman
scattering into the SPDC spectral channel. The system also requires modifications to
reduce the scattering.
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Chapter 6
High- dimensional
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen steering
In this chapter, we introduce Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) steering and describe
how it can be observed using the EB DO-QKD setup, both in the lab and over the
deployed fiber.
6.1 Introduction to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen steer-
ing
EPR steering (or steerability) is a form of quantum correlation that lies between
entanglement and Bell nonlocality [189-192]. Entanglement, or equivalently, nonsep-
arability, refers to the fact that the composite state IT) of two particles A and B
cannot be written as the tensor product of the single-particle states IV)A) and 'l'B):
J'I) # I V)A) 9 1?)B), (6.1)
while a separable state can. If the composite state of Alice and Bob's systems is sep-
arable, then Alice and Bob's systems share only classical correlations. Two common
tests for quantum correlations, i.e., for entanglement, are entanglement witnesses and
Bell inequalities. An entanglement witness W is an observable with expectation value
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(01W1#) > 0 for all separable states 15) and (#1W10) < 0 for at least one entangled
state 1#) [193, 1941. Thus, measuring (01W10) < 0 would indicate that the state 1#) is
entangled. Alternatively, entanglement is implied by the violation of a Bell inequality,
which tests for Bell nonlocality [135]. Bell nonlocality rules out the existence of local
hidden variable models that describe reality [135, 195] and is the strongest form of
quantum correlation.
Like Bell inequalities, steering inequalities can also serve as tests for nonsepa-
rability. Steering is a type of quantum correlation that is strictly stronger than
entanglement and strictly weaker than Bell nonlocality [189-1911. That is, all states
that demonstrate steerability are also entangled/nonseparable, but not all nonsep-
arable states are steerable. Similarly, all states that violate a Bell inequality are
steerable (and also entangled/nonseparable), but not all steerable states demonstrate
Bell nonlocality [1961. All pure entangled states demonstrate both steerability and
Bell nonlocality [189], but some mixed entangled states can be steerable without be-
ing Bell-nonlocal (or nonseparable without being steerable). A well-studied example
of such mixed entangled states is the family of Werner states [1971. The Werner state
for qubits can be written as
W = (1 - T)- + g|r-)(W-|, (6.2)2 4
where I is the identity, ITv-) is a maximally entangled state, such as the singlet Bell
state, and 0 < q < 1 is a mixing parameter [189, 190, 1961. For qubits, the state is
nonseparable if and only if (iff) TI > 1 ent = 1/3, and the state violates the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [136] iff 1 > 1/v/_. To violate any form of
Bell inequality, the lower bound on T is TBell > 0.6565 [198]. However, the state is
steerable if 7 > 7steer = 1/2, which is strictly less than Bell [189, 1901. Refs. [189, 190]
generalize this analysis to higher-dimensional Werner states and also to other families
of states, and Ref. [196] experimentally demonstrates steering using qubit Werner
states that do not violate the CHSH inequality.
Steering can be defined as a task: Alice prepares a bipartite quantum state, sends
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half of it to Bob, and measures her own half. By measuring her system, Alice can
remotely steer Bob's system. She cannot deterministically prepare Bob's system in a
desired state (that would be superluminal signaling), but if she sends her measurement
results to Bob, Bob can measure his own system and check that his conditional states
have been steered [1951. After a sufficiently large number of repetitions, Bob can
estimate the strength of the correlations between his system and Alice's [195]. The
goal is for Alice to convince Bob that she can prepare entangled states and steer Bob's
system. The alternative is that Bob's system is described by some local hidden state
model [1891. A local hidden state model is the steering analogue of a local hidden
variable model in Bell tests.
As with Bell tests, steering experiments also have loopholes, but they are easier to
close than those of Bell tests. In particular, the detection efficiency required to close
the detection loophole is lower than the threshold for Bell tests [195, 199], and in
fact, the required efficiency can be made arbitrarily low [200]. As a result, loophole-
free steering experiments [201J were achieved years before loophole-free Bell tests
[137, 138, 202].
Entanglement and Bell nonlocality are both symmetric between Alice and Bob,
but as the task-based definition shows, steering is inherently asymmetric [189]. The
asymmetry of the steering task implies that Bob must trust both quantum mechanics
and his own measurements but need not trust Alice, her measurements, or the entan-
glement source [192]. This asymmetric trust allows for one-sided device-independent
QKD (1SDI-QKD) [203, 204J, where the security is tied to the violation of an EPR
steering inequality. Practically, 1SDI-QKD broadens the scope of possible scenarios
for QKD; for example, it is well-suited to scenarios when Bob is in a fixed, secure
location but Alice may be roaming in an untrusted region. Because it is experimen-
tally easier to violate a steering inequality than a Bell inequality, it is also easier to
implement 1SDI-QKD than fully DI QKD. For 1SDI-QKD, the detection loophole
must be closed, but as previously stated, the required efficiency is lower than that for
fully DI QKD [195, 203]. Additionally, the locality and freedom-of-choice loopholes
become irrelevant, since security proofs already assume that no information can leak
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out of Alice's or Bob's labs unless they allow it [2001.
Because steering is strictly stronger than entanglement, the violation of an EPR
steering inequality over some channel indicates that the channel preserves entangle-
ment. We can use the EB DO-QKD setup and the same TB and FB measurements
to test a high-dimensional EPR steering inequality over the deployed fiber, thereby
confirming that we can distribute time-energy entanglement from LL to MIT. Time-
energy entanglement is commonly verified using a Franson interferometer setup [881.
However, if we used a Franson interferometer to test for entanglement over the de-
ployed fiber, we would have to build and stabilize two separate interferometers located
on opposite ends of the deployed fiber, and we would have to maintain the path length
imbalances of the two interferometers such that their difference remains less than the
biphoton coherence length. This might require us to also build a new real-time feed-
back system. However, by testing steerability instead of Franson interference, we
can verify entanglement distribution without making any setup modifications and, in
particular, without requiring interferometric stability or real-time feedback.
6.2 Steering inequality for continous variables using
discretized measurements
The photons produced by the SPDC source are entangled in time and frequency, which
are continuous degrees of freedom. Ref. [205] introduces an EPR steering inequality
for continuous variables that relies on discretized measurements:
H (TB TA) + H (QBIQA) > og 2 (CW (6-3)
(AtBAWB)
A state that satisfies this inequality could be described by a local hidden state model.
We define the steering parameter, S, as the left-hand side (LHS) of this inequality:
S = H(TBITA) + H(QBIQA). Here, H(TBITA) is the discrete Shannon entropy of
measurements of the arrival time of Bob's photon conditioned on measurements of
the arrival time of Alice's photon. We assume that the range of possible arrival
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times, denoted Tf, is broken up into M discrete time slots of duration AtB; thus,
Tf = Mx AtB. Similarly, H(QBIQA) is the discrete Shannon entropy of measurements
of the frequency of Bob's photon conditioned on measurements of the frequency of
Alice's photon. We assume that the frequency is measured with resolution AWB.
We note that (6.3) explicitly depends on the resolution of Bob's measurements only.
We assume that Alice and Bob use the same measurement settings with temporal
resolution At = AtB and frequency resolution AW = AWB-
Using the dispersive FB measurements, the frequency resolution AW is related to
the temporal resolution At by
27rc AtAw = 32D,(6.4)
A 2 'D
where A is the photon wavelength and D is the magnitude of the applied GVD in
units of ps/nm. In our experiment, A - 1560 nm and D - 10,000 ps/nm. We assume
that there are M discrete frequency slots of width At, and thus the range of possible
frequencies is Qf = M x A.
The analysis of the timetagged photon detection events follows the same sifting
procedure used for DO-QKD and illustrated in Fig. 3-2. Unlike DO-QKD, the steering
analysis does not require error reconciliation or privacy amplification. From the raw
keys, we build up M x M joint probability matrices for each of the two measurement
bases: PT(TA,TB) and PQ(QA, QB). For example, pT(a, b), the entry in the ath row
and bth column of PT, is the probability that using the TB, Alice detected her photon
in the ath slot and Bob detected his in the bth slot:
NT(a, b)
pT(a, b) = , b (6.5) NT B
where NT(a, b) is the number of instances when Alice detected her photon in the ath
slot and Bob detected his in the bth slot, and NTB is the total number of coincidences
detected using the TB. Similarly, p (a, b), the entry in the ath row and bth column
of PQ, is the probability that using the FB, Alice detected her photon in the ath slot
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and Bob detected his in the bth slot, and
p(a, b) = ,b) (6.6)
NFB
where NQ(a, b) and NFB are the FB analogues to NT(a, b) and NTB, respectively.
Using the joint probability matrices, we can compute all relevant entropies to obtain
the steering parameter, S. Without loss of generality, we define the entropies and
write all further calculations using only the TB; the results are the same for the FB.
H(TBITA) = H(TATB) - H(TA) (6.7)
H(TA,TB) = PT(a, b) log2 PT(a, b) (6-8)
ab
H(TA) = - pT(a)log 2 PT(a), (6.9)
a
where
pT(a) = Z:PT(a, b). (6.10)
b
We also compute JS, the uncertainty in S, by assuming that coincidence counts
follow Poissonian statistics. The uncertainty in number of counts NT(a, b) for a given
matrix entry is assumed to be 6NT(a, b) = V/NT(a, b). This uncertainty is propagated
through the probability and entropy calculations, as detailed in Appendix B.
6.3 Results and discussion
Fig. 6-1 plots the steering parameter as measured both locally at LL and over the
deployed fiber for M E {2, 4, 8} and 25 < At < 200 ps. The right-hand side (RHS) of
(6.3) is also plotted as a solid black curve. Violations of the steering inequality (6.3)
occur in the region under this curve. The size of the error bars is JS.
We define the degree of violation as the quantity
7re
log 2  - S(M, AtB), (6.11)
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Figure 6-1: Steering parameter, S, as a function of At for alphabet size M E {2, 4, 8},
measured locally at LL and over the deployed fiber. The black solid curve indicates the
value of the RHS of (6.3). Points under this curve indicate violations of the steering
inequality.
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i.e., the RHS of (6.3) minus the LHS of (6.3), where a positive value indicates that
(6.3) is violated and Bob's system could not be described by a local hidden state
model. Here, S(M, AtB) denotes the value of the steering parameter for a particular
choice of M and 'At = AtB (with AWB Oc AtB). The values of M and AtB both di-
rectly affect the degree of violation. For example, the degree of violation increases as
At decreases because this directly makes the RHS of (6.3) bigger. However, decreas-
ing At also indirectly affects S because the temporal resolution affects the entropy
calculations; decreasing At also indirectly causes S to increase, but this is offset by a
larger increase in the RHS of (6.3).
The degree of violation also increases as M decreases because this directly makes
S smaller. However, it is undesirable to make M arbitrarily small because this also
decreases the mutual information between Alice and Bob. Fig. 6-2 plots the raw
mutual information obtained for M = 4 in each basis, locally at LL and over the de-
ployed fiber. In theory, I(A; B) should be the same for each basis; in our experiments,
the mutual information obtained in the FB is lower due to the imperfect dispersion
cancellation of the Proximion GVD elements, as described in Section 5.3.2. The im-
perfect dispersion cancellation broadens the correlation peak width, which reduces
the mutual information. For the experiment over the deployed fiber, the mutual in-
formation in the FB is significantly lower than that of the TB because the timing
jitter of the FB SNSPD on campus was - 90 ps greater than that of the TB SNSPD,
which also broadens the correlation peak width and reduces the mutual information.
No steps were taken in the current analysis to correct for this difference in timing
jitter.
Fig. 6-2 shows that I(A; B) is minimal for small At, where the degree of violation
is greatest. We assume that applications of this EPR steering inequality will take
advantage of its high-dimensional nature, i.e., its ability to show steerability while also
exchanging a large amount of mutual information per detected photon coincidence
[2061. Therefore, a high degree of violation alone is not necessarily satisfactory; we
would like to violate the steering inequality with sufficient confidence (in this case, a
situation-dependent number of standard deviations), while also achieving high mutual
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Figure 6-2: Alice and Bob's mutual information, I(A; B), as a function of At, measured
in both bases locally at LL and over the deployed fiber. Small values of At are correlated
with small values of I(A; B) but also with high degrees of violation of (6.3). Dashed
lines are visual aids to differentiate the data series.
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M At Degree of SS I(A; B) I(A; B) Degree of JS I(A; B) I(A; B)
(ps) violation in TB in FB violation in TB in FB
25 5.473 0.005 0.007 0.003 5.463 0.116 0.000 0.000
2 50 3.567 0.004 0.074 0.030 3.466 0.083 0.002 0.000
100 1.958 0.118 0.310 0.184 1.503 0.061 0.033 0.006
25 3.647 0.012 0.120 0.048 3.469 0.249 0.004 0.001
4 50 2.298 0.013 0.509 0.297 1.538 0.185 0.054 0.013
100 1.247 0.118 0.996 0.774 -0.062 0.158 0.340 0.109
25 2.435 0.043 0.594 0.338 1.550 0.519 0.061 0.017
8 50 1.700 0.118 1.266 0.942 0.008 0.463 0.388 0.123
100 0.906 0.147 1.845 1.587 -0.925 0.724 1.023 0.552
Table 6.1: Steering results for selected values of At, highlighting the tradeoff between
degree of violation and mutual information.
information. Table 6.1 lists the degree of violation as defined in (6.11), SS, and
mutual information in both bases, obtained locally and over the deployed fiber, for
some combinations of M and AtB, reiterating the trade-off between high degree of
violation and high mutual information.
To our knowledge, this is the first demonstrated violation of a high-dimensional
EPR steering inequality over a deployed fiber, and possibly the first violation of any
steering inequality over a deployed fiber. We note that when using our dispersion-
based frequency measurements with IDI = 10, 000 ps/nm, the RHS of (6.3) constrains
AtB < 330 ps. This implies the need for high-resolution single-photon detectors,
which have only become widely available at telecom wavelengths in the past few
years.
By violating the high-dimensional EPR steering inequality in the lab and over the
deployed fiber, we confirm that our SPDC source produces pairs of entangled photonsi
and that we can successfully distribute entanglement (or equivalently, nonseparabil-
ity) over the fiber link. This marks an important milestone in the development of our
Boston-area quantum network.
'Performing QKD experiments does not necessarily confirm the presence of entanglement. QKD
does not explicitly require entangled photons but does require that the channel is not entanglement-
breaking [23].
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Chapter 7
Summary and outlook
We described DO-QKD and its first security proof, which shows asymptotic security
against the class of arbitrary collective attacks [2]. As part of this thesis, we extended
the security proof to show that DO-QKD still provides security against collective
attacks even in the realistic regime of finite-length keys [721. Assuming achievable
parameters, we numerically showed that DO-QKD obtains > 90% of the asymptotic
secure PIE for an experimentally feasible number of detected coincidences, N ~ 107,
with performance on par with other single-photon QKD protocols.
We then described the P&M implementation of DO-QKD, including demonstra-
tions both in the lab and over our newly developed, 42-km deployed-fiber testbed
running between MIT and MITLL. By the combined advantages of high-dimensional
encoding and fast single-photon detectors, we achieved record secret-key rates for
each channel loss tested [761.
We then described the EB implementation of DO-QKD, including the construc-
tion of multiple SPDC sources, the first demonstration in the lab [71J, and steps
toward demonstrating DO-QKD over the deployed fiber. We then noted that the
same EB DO-QKD setup could be used to violate an EPR steering inequality with-
out requiring interferometric stability or real-time feedback. Since steering is a type
of quantum correlation that is strictly stronger than entanglement, a violation of a
steering inequality is also a proof of entanglement. We violated a high-dimensional
EPR steering inequality in the lab and over the deployed fiber, confirming that our
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SPDC source produces pairs of entangled photons and that we can successfully dis-
tribute the entanglement over the fiber link. In doing so, we have performed the first
demonstration of the violation of a high-dimensional EPR steering inequality over a
deployed fiber.
The deployed-fiber experiments require further investigation related to timing ac-
curacy, which we expect would only improve upon the results presented here. To
successfully demonstrate EB DO-QKD over the deployed fiber, we would have to
improve the nonlocal dispersion cancellation. We note that Ref. [73] is an updated
security proof for DO-QKD that holds against general attacks, albeit with more pes-
simistic secret-key rates, compared to the proofs presented here, and it would be
useful to apply that proof to the current or any future data. Also in the future,
the EB DO-QKD setup could be integrated with the LL fiber stabilization system
described in Ref. [188], pending some modifications relating to reducing noise caused
by that system.
Ultimately, we have demonstrated both the utility of high-dimensional QKD and
the feasibility of our testbed for further applications in quantum communication and
networking. In the future, the testbed could serve as one link in a multi-node Boston-
area quantum network. Besides providing point-to-point links between a larger num-
ber of locations, quantum networks also enable advanced applications involving more
than two users, such as measurement-device-independent QKD [207], a QKD variant
in which Alice and Bob are joined by Charlie, a referee, to produce secure keys while
removing the need for trust in the single-photon detectors. The resources developed
during this work provide a foundation for future demonstrations of new quantum
networking applications and capabilities.
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Appendix A
Timing correlations after applying
dispersion
In this appendix, we mathematically verify the relationship between O-t, the two-
photon correlation time after applying GVD, and a-, the spectral correlation between
Alice and Bob's detected photons.
We start by writing the original two-photon correlation time, assuming a non-
specific biphoton state, as
Oc20r= J dtdu(t - U)2( ks(t)E(u)Ei(u)Es(t)). (A.1)
When applying equal and opposite GVD with magnitude D, the field operators are
described in the frequency domain as
sA(t) dw As(w)e-iwteiDw 2/2 (A.2)
f 2,7r
E[ (t) = -A,~~ -~22 (A.3)2r
where w is defined as the detuning from wp/2, and wp is the pump frequency of the
SPDC source. The phase oc u 2 is due to the GVD. Subscripts S denote the signal
photon and I denote the idler photon.
Using these field operators, the two-photon correlation time after Alice applies
119
normal GVD and Bob applies anomalous GVD is then
f
2= ddu wd] )dtdu (t - u) 2K At(w')At () Z A, s(w ) )
x exp [it(w' - W) + in( ' - ) + iD(w 2  2 2 +
We make a change of variables t = t u and obtain
2 = I dt+dt d w t2 (At ( )At ,)jA ) As(w))2 2 j- (27)4 - S I
i(w' - w)(t+ + t_) + i( ' (t+ - t_)
x exp 2
xep iD (W2 _ 2 _;/2 +(')
Then we define w - w w' and (a - ', resulting in
2 1
t 2
dw+dw-d+d 
- d2
(27r) 4( w-) At +
xexpit+(-W- - -)
1 2
As( +, +
+it_ ( _ - W-) +iD(w + w-- + )
2 2
(A.6)
dt+ exp it(-W- - )27r6(w_L 2J
Ats (
x 27r6(w- + -) exp
) At + 2 A
it_(_-w)
2 s 2
iD(w~w- - +)
2
(A.8)
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(A.4)
(A.5)
We use
1 I
to obtain
2 -1 dL dw+-dw<+ <- 2
4j (27r)4 -
(A.7)
'7 ' I
............. "I'll". ","",-,;,." "I'llI 111.  - - ,
After carrying out the integral over _, we obtain
2 = I dw+dwd-+ 2
t 4 f (27r) 3
-
( + - A + - A(+ +
x exp it-w_ + 2+ 
(A.9)
We will use
S-27 d 2 (A. 10)
so to solve Eq. (A.9), we must integrate by parts twice. Doing so, we obtain
S2 -27r {dw+dw-d+
~t = 4 J (2 7r)3-
d(w_) 2 ZsS ( 2~w Ai (+ w
x exp 2
(A. 11)
To differentiate the expectation value in Eq. (A.11), we rewrite the operators as
A(w) = Jdt(t)ewt (A.12)
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xK A s +-
dt- t2 e-i-w--
At 2 As 
+
After differentiating twice with respect to w_, we obtain
t = (7dw+d+ dtdudt'du'(E (t') E(u')E, (u) Es (t)) 6(w)
x exp (t
x exp (t
2
x -(t+t'
+2- (t +
- t') + (u
+ t' - (a + U')) + iDw_ (w+ +
D22
-U (+U'))2_ - (U 9 + + 24
iD
t' - (u + U')) 2 P+ +) W
(A.13)
After integrating over w_, we obtain
2= 1 J +d tdudt'du'
x (s (t')sji(u')s1 (u) s(t)) exp iw+ (t -t') +
1
2
D2
(t+t'-(u+u))2- 4 + +2
+2 (t
- U
(A.14)
+ t' - (u + U')) ( GO+ +)
For notational ease, we divide at into three terms, at X1 + X2 + X3, where
(w+2d') dtdudt'du' ( t )t (u/')Ei (u) ) s (t))
x exp (t - t')
X2-1
4
+ 2 (u
j (2r) )-, U s()
x exp (t -t') + (u -
2
I) ((
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x -
X1 -
- (U + U')) ,
(A.15)
(A. 16)
+ +)2
- u (t + t'
and
X 1 = dw+ dtdudt'du' (Et (t') Eli (u') Ei (u) Es (t))
x exp i+ (t - t') + (u -U')
x (D(t + t', (u + u')) (w+ + +-
It can be easily shown by integrating over w+ and + that X1 simplifies to
X1 J dtdu(t - U)2 kt(t E(u)g,(u)Zs(t))
W w2
= 
0
cor,
We will show a few more steps of the simplification of X2 , starting with
X2 = (D 2
(D 2
k (u) s(t)) exp [<+dtdudu' ((tt (u')
dw+ dtdudt'du'( (t'') Ej (W)E 1 (U) Es (t))(27r)2
x exp (t - t') + (u - u') w+ +-
After integration by parts and using Eq. (A.12) to rewrite the operators, we obtain
= - D dtdUdtdwdwds(w))6(t - t')
d2d
xdt'2 (exp [iw't' + iu(~ W ) iwt])
- D2 dtduduidwddw'd< (As ()j (27r)4 At(')AI( )As(w))6(u - u') (A.20)
x du'2 (exp[it(w - w') + iu' ' - iun])
- 2D2  dtdudt'du' dwddw'dt' s N')Z,( ')ZI( A s(w))
d d
x 6t - t')6(u - U) dt' du' (exp[iw't' + i<'U' - iv - iwt]).
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(A.17)
(A. 18)
dtdudt'( (t) (u) k,(u) ks(t)) exp iw+(t - t') 2
U'/) C{(u
(A.19)
-
After taking the derivatives and integrating over the 6-functions, we obtain
X2= -D 2  dtdu dwd~dw'd(' ( A(' ')AZ(t)s(w))
x (-W'2 _ 2 - 2w' ') exp[it(w' - w) + iu((' -
After simplifying more 6-functions, we obtain
X2 = D 2 f
= D2J
(2w) (A's(w)A()Ai( )As(w))(w + )2
(A.21)
(A.22)
It turns out that X3 is the tricky term, since it contains one power of time and
one power of frequency. X3 has the form f(x) = f dxx exp[iax], which does not
converge, but its Cauchy principal value is zero, and thus we can simplify the integral
as X3 = 0.
Therefore, ot, the two-photon correlation time after applying GVD is related to
oW by by O2 = O2 + D 2Uw2
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Appendix B
Uncertainty in the steering. parameter
In this appendix, we derive an expression for 6S, the uncertainty in the steering
parameter. The steering parameter is defined as the left-hand side of the inequality
(6.3). Without loss of generality, we write most calculations using only the time basis
(TB); the results are the same, with different subscripts, for the frequency basis (FB).
PT(TA, TB) is an M x M joint probability matrix of Alice and Bob's measurements
in the TB, built using the raw keys. pT(a, b), the entry in the ath row and bth column
of PT, is the probability that using the TB, Alice detected her photon in the ath slot
and Bob detected his in the bth slot:
PT(a, b) = NT(a, b) (B.1)
NT B
where NT(a, b) is the number of instances when Alice detected her photon in the ath
slot and Bob detected his in the bth slot, and NTB is the total number of coincidences
detected using the TB. Assuming that coincidence counts follow Poissonian statistics,
the uncertainty in number of counts NT(a, b) for a given matrix entry is 6NT(a, b) =
NT(a, b). Then, the uncertainty in NTB, the total number of coincidences detected
using the TB, is
6NTB= 6NT(a, b)2 = VNTB. (B.2)
a,b
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Then, the uncertainty in each matrix entry pT(a, b) is
NT(a, b) 2
NT(a, b) )
+ (:NTB 2
NTB
I a~) 2 + 2
=\1(N-T(a, b))( NTB)
SNT(a, b) + NTB
To compute uncertainties of entropies, we will use
6 (092PT~, b) 1 6 pT(a, b)(log2PT(ab))lg2 p(a, b)
We will also use the entropy formulas
H(TBITA) = H(TATB) - H(TA)
H(TA, TB)
H(TA)
.- PT(a, b) log 2 PT(a, b)
ab
= - pT(a)1og 2pT(a),
where
PT (a) = pT (a, b).
b
Computing the uncertainty in H(TA, TB), the joint entropy, we have
6 (PT (a, b) log 2 PT (a, b))
PT (a, b) log 2 PT (a, b)
6H(TA, TB)
6pT(a, b) 2
PT(a, b) )
(6 (log2 PT (a, b)) ) 2
og2 PT(a, b)
(6 (pT (a, b) log 2 PT(a, b))) 2 .
a,b
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3pT(a, b)
PT(a, b)
(B.3)
(B.4)
(B.5)
(B.6)
(B.7)
(B.8)
(B.9)
(B.10)
To compute the uncertainty in H(TA), the Shannon entropy, we have
6PT (a) = Z(pT (a, b)) 2  (B.11)
b
6 ( PT (a) 10lo2 PT (a) = PTs 2 +(6 (10g2 PT (a) )2 ( B. 12)
\ P() + (log 2 PT (a)
6H(TA) = (6 (PT (a) log2 PT (a)))2. (B.13)
Then, the uncertainty in H(TBITA), the conditional entropy, is
6H(TB TA) = (SH(TATB +(SH(TA) 2 . (B.14)
Using similar calculations to compute 6H(QBIQA), we can obtain
6S = V/(6H(TBTA)) + (6H(QBQA)) 2 . (B.15)
127
128
Bibliography
[1] Zhou, H., Wang, L. & Wornell, G. Layered schemes for large-alphabet secret key
distribution. In Proc. Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA),
2013, 1-10 (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, 2013).
[2] Mower, J. et al. High-dimensional quantum key distribution using dispersive
optics. Phys. Rev. A 87, 062322 (2013).
[3] Comandar, L. C. et al. Room temperature single-photon detectors for high bit
rate quantum key distribution. Appl. Phys. Lett. 104, 021101 (2014).
[4] Zhong, T. et al. Photon-efficient quantum key distribution using time-energy
entanglement with high-dimensional encoding. New J. Phys. 17, 022002 (2015).
[5] Comandar, L. C. et al. Quantum cryptography without detector vulnerabilities
using optically-seeded lasers. Nat. Photon. 10, 312-315 (2016).
[6] Huang, D., Huang, P., Lin, D. & Zeng, G. Long-distance continuous-variable
quantum key distribution by controlling excess noise. Sci. Rep. 6, 19201 (2016).
[7] Treiber, A. et al. A fully automated entanglement-based quantum cryptography
system for telecom fiber networks. New J. Phys. 11, 045013 (2009).
[81 Korzh, B. et al. Provably secure and practical quantum key distribution over
307 km of optical fibre. Nat. Photon. 9, 163-168 (2015).
[9] Feamster, N., Balakrishnan, H., Rexford, J., Shaikh, A. & van der Merwe, J.
The Case for Separating Routing from Routers. In Proceedings of the ACM
SIGCOMM Workshop on Future Directions in Network Architecture, FDNA
'04, 5-12 (ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2004).
[10] Arnbak, A. & Goldberg, S. Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitu-
tion: Unrestricted Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network
Traffic Abroad. Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 21, 317-361 (2014).
http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol2l/iss2/3.
[111 Rogaway, P. The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2015/1162 (2015). http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1162.
129
[121 Diffie, W. & Hellman, M. New directions in cryptography. Information Theory,
IEEE Transactions on 22, 644-654 (1976).
[131 Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A. & Adleman, L. M. A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM 21,
120-126 (1978).
[141 Miller, V. S. Use of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography, 417-426 (Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1986).
[151 Koblitz, N. Elliptic curve cryptosystems. Mathematics of Computation 48,
203-209 (1987).
[161 Campagna, M. et al. Quantum Safe Cryptography and Security: An introduc-
tion, benefits, enablers and challenges. ETSI White Paper No. 8 (2015).
[17] Shor, P. W. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete
logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM Journal on Computing 26, 1484-
1509 (1997).
[18] Lenstra, A. K., Lenstra, H. W., Manasse, M. S. & Pollard, J. M. The number
field sieve, 11-42 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1993).
[191 Smolin, J. A., Smith, G. & Vargo, A. Oversimplifying quantum factoring.
Nature (London) 499, 163-165 (2013).
[201 Mosca, M. Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will
we be ready? Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/1075 (2015).
http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1075.
[21] Bernstein, D. J., Buchmann, J. & Dahmen, E. Post-quantum cryptography
(Springer Science & Business Media, 2009).
[22j Chen, L. et al. Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography. National Institute of
Standards and Technology Internal Report 8105 (2016).
[23] Scarani, V. et al. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Rev. Mod.
Phys. 81, 1301-1350 (2009).
[24] Renner, R. Security of quantum key distribution. Int. J. Quantum Inform. 6,
1-127 (2008).
[251 Vernam, G. S. Cipher printing telegraph systems: For secret wire and radio
telegraphic communications. J. Am. Inst. Electr. Eng. 45, 109-115 (1926).
[26] Shannon, C. E. Communication theory of secrecy systems. The Bell System
Technical Journal 28, 656-715 (1949).
[27] Schneier, B. Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in
C (Wiley, Indianapolis, IN, 1996), 2nd edn.
130
[28] Paterson, K. G., Piper, F. & Schack, R. Quantum cryptography: a practical
information security perspective. In Zukowski, M., Kilin, S. & Kowalik, J.
(eds.) Quantum Communication and Security, Proceedings, NATO Advanced
Research Workshop, 175-180 (IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2007).
[29j Bennett, C. H., Bessete, F., Brassard, G., Salvail, L. & Smolin, J. Experimental
quantum cryptography. Journal of Cryptology 5, 3-28 (1992).
[30] Wegman, M. N. & Carter, J. L. New hash functions and their use in authenti-
cation and set equality. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 22, 265-279
(1981).
[31] Bennett, C. H. & Brassard, G. Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distri-
bution and Coin Tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on
Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, 175-179 (IEEE, New York, 1984).
[32] Scarani, V. & Kurtsiefer, C. The black paper of quantum cryptography: Real
implementation problems. Theoretical Computer Science 560, 27-32 (2014).
[33] Jain, N. et al. Attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems (and how
to prevent them). Contemporary Physics 57, 366-387 (2016).
[341 Stebila, D., Mosca, M. & Liitkenhaus, N. The Case for Quantum Key Dis-
tribution. In Sergienko, A., Pascazio, S. & Villoresi, P. (eds.) Quantum Com-
munication and Quantum Networking: First International Conference, Quan-
tumComm 2009, Naples, Italy, October 26-30, 2009, Revised Selected Papers,
283-296 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010).
[351 Ekert, A. K. Quantum cryptography based on Bell's theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett.
67, 661-663 (1991).
[36 Bennett, C. H., Brassard, G. & Mermin, N. D. Quantum cryptography without
Bell's theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557-559 (1992).
[37] Barreiro, J. T., Langford, N. K., Peters, N. A. & Kwiat, P. G. Generation of
Hyperentangled Photon Pairs. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 260501 (2005).
[38] Kaszlikowski, D., Gnaciniski, P., 2ukowski, M., Miklaszewski, W. & Zeilinger,
A. Violations of Local Realism by Two Entangled N-Dimensional Systems Are
Stronger than for Two Qubits. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 4418-4421 (2000).
[39] Durt, T., Kaszlikowski, D. & 2ukowski, M. Violations of local realism with
quantum systems described by N -dimensional Hilbert spaces up to N = 16.
Phys. Rev. A 64, 024101 (2001).
[40] Collins, D., Gisin, N., Linden, N., Massar, S. & Popescu, S. Bell Inequalities
for Arbitrarily High-Dimensional Systems. Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 040404 (2002).
131
[411 Wrtesi, T., Pironio, S. & Brunner, N. Closing the Detection Loophole in Bell
Experiments Using Qudits. Phys. Rev. Lett. 104, 060401 (2010).
[421 Dada, A. C., Leach, J., Buller, G. S., Padgett, M. J. & Andersson, E. Experi-
mental high-dimensional two-photon entanglement and violations of generalized
Bell inequalities. Nat. Phys. 7, 677-680 (2011).
[43J Nowierski, S. J., Oza, N. N., Kumar, P. & Kanter, G. S. Tomographic recon-
struction of time-bin-entangled qudits. Phys. Rev. A 94, 042328 (2016).
[441 Massar, S. Nonlocality, closing the detection loophole, and communication
complexity. Phys. Rev. A 65, 032121 (2002).
[45] Goyal, S. K. et al. Qudit-Teleportation for photons with linear optics. Sci. Rep.
4, 4543 (2014).
[461 Caslav Brukner, Zukowski, M. & Zeilinger, A. Quantum Communication Com-
plexity Protocol with Two Entangled Qutrits. Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 197901
(2002).
[471 Caslav Brukner, Zukowski, M., Pan, J.-W. & Zeilinger, A. Bell's Inequalities
and Quantum Communication Complexity. Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 127901 (2004).
[481 Lanyon, B. P. et al. Simplifying quantum logic using higher-dimensional Hilbert
spaces. Nat. Phys. 5, 134-140 (2009).
[49] Muralidharan, S., Zou, C.-L., Li, L., Wen, J. & Jiang, L. Overcoming erasure
errors with multilevel systems. New J. Phys. 19, 013026 (2017).
[50] Fickler, R. et al. Quantum Entanglement of High Angular Momenta. Science
338, 640-643 (2012).
[511 Ali Khan, I. & Howell, J. C. Experimental demonstration of high two-photon
time-energy entanglement. Phys. Rev. A 73, 031801 (2006).
[52] Ali-Khan, I., Broadbent, C. J. & Howell, J. C. Large-Alphabet Quantum Key
Distribution Using Energy-Time Entangled Bipartite States. Phys. Rev. Lett.
98, 060503 (2007).
[53] Durt, T., Cerf, N. J., Gisin, N. & 2ukowski, M. Security of quantum key
distribution with entangled qutrits. Phys. Rev. A 67, 012311 (2003).
[541 Durt, T., Kaszlikowski, D., Chen, J.-L. & Kwek, L. C. Security of quantum key
distributions with entangled qudits. Phys. Rev. A 69, 032313 (2004).
[55] Cerf, N. J., Bourennane, M., Karlsson, A. & Gisin, N. Security of Quantum
Key Distribution Using d-Level Systems. Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 127902 (2002).
[56] Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H. & Tittel, W. Quantum cryptography using larger
alphabets. Phys. Rev. A 61, 062308 (2000).
132
[57] Grover, L. K. A Fast Quantum Mechanical Algorithm For Database Search.
In Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, STOC '96, 212-219 (ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1996).
[581 Choi, I. et al. Field trial of a quantum secured 10 Gb/s DWDM transmission
system over a single installed fiber. Opt. Express 22, 23121-23128 (2014).
[591 Lucamarini, M. et al. Efficient decoy-state quantum key distribution with quan-
tified security. Opt. Express 21, 24550-24565 (2013).
[60] Walborn, S. P., Lemelle, D. S., Almeida, M. P. & Ribeiro, P. H. S. Quantum Key
Distribution with Higher-Order Alphabets Using Spatially Encoded Qudits.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 090501 (2006).
[61] Zhang, L., Silberhorn, C. & Walmsley, I. A. Secure Quantum Key Distribution
using Continuous Variables of Single Photons. Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 110504
(2008).
[62] Etcheverry, S. et al. Quantum key distribution session with 16-dimensional
photonic states. Sci. Rep. 3, 2316 (2013).
[63] Canas, G. et al. High-dimensional decoy-state quantum key distribution over
multicore telecommunication fibers. Phys. Rev. A 96, 022317 (2017).
[64] Ding, Y. et al. High-Dimensional Quantum Key Distribution based on Multicore
Fiber using Silicon Photonic Integrated Circuits. npj Quantum Information 3,
25 (2017).
[65] Tittel, W., Brendel, J., Zbinden, H. & Gisin, N. Quantum Cryptography Using
Entangled Photons in Energy-Time Bell States. Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4737-4740
(2000).
[661 Qi, B. Single-photon continuous-variable quantum key distribution based on
the energy-time uncertainty relation. Opt. Lett. 31, 2795-2797 (2006).
[671 Nunn, J. et al. Large-alphabet time-frequency entangled quantum key distribu-
tion by means of time-to-frequency conversion. Opt. Express 21, 15959-15973
(2013).
[68] Brougham, T., Barnett, S. M., McCusker, K. T., Kwiat, P. G. & Gauthier,
D. J. Security of high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocols using
Franson interferometers. J. Phys. B: At. Mol. Opt. Phys. 46, 104010 (2013).
[69] Zhang, Z., Mower, J., Englund, D., Wong, F. N. C. & Shapiro, J. H. Uncondi-
tional Security of Time-Energy Entanglement Quantum Key Distribution Using
Dual-Basis Interferometry. Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 120506 (2014).
[701 Brougham, T. & Barnett, S. M. Cavity-enabled high-dimensional quantum key
distribution. J. Phys. B: At. Mol. Opt. Phys. 47, 155501 (2014).
133
[711 Lee, C. et al. Entanglement-based quantum communication secured by nonlocal
dispersion cancellation. Phys. Rev. A 90, 062331 (2014).
[721 Lee, C., Mower, J., Zhang, Z., Shapiro, J. & Englund, D. Finite-key analysis of
high-dimensional time-energy entanglement-based quantum key distribution.
Quantum Inf. Process. 14, 1005-1015 (2015).
[73] Niu, M. Y., Xu, F., Shapiro, J. H. & Furrer, F. Finite-key analysis for time-
energy high-dimensional quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. A 94, 052323
(2016).
[741 Walk, N., Barrett, J. & Nunn, J. Composably secure time-frequency quantum
key distribution. arXiv:1609.09436 [quant-ph] (2016).
[75] Islam, N. T. et al. Robust and Stable Delay Interferometers with Application to
d-Dimensional Time-Frequency Quantum Key Distribution. Phys. Rev. Applied
7, 044010 (2017).
[76] Lee, C. et al. High-rate field demonstration of large-alphabet quantum key
distribution. arXiv:1611.01139 [quant-phl (2016).
[77] Gr6blacher, S., Jennewein, T., Vaziri, A., Weihs, G. & Zeilinger, A. Experi-
mental quantum cryptography with qutrits. New J. Phys. 8, 75 (2006).
[78] Mafu, M. et al. Higher-dimensional orbital-angular-momentum-based quantum
key distribution with mutually unbiased bases. Phys. Rev. A 88, 032305 (2013).
[791 Mirhosseini, M. et al. High-dimensional quantum cryptography with twisted
light. New J. Phys. 17, 033033 (2015).
[80] Takesue, H. & Inoue, K. Generation of 1.5-gm band time-bin entanglement
using spontaneous fiber four-wave mixing and planar light-wave circuit inter-
ferometers. Phys. Rev. A 72, 041804 (2005).
[81] Takesue, H. Long-distance distribution of time-bin entanglement generated in
a cooled fiber. Opt. Express 14, 3453-3460 (2006).
[82] Dyer, S. D., Baek, B. & Nam, S. W. High-brightness, low-noise, all-fiber photon
pair source. Opt. Express 17, 10290-10297 (2009).
[83] Kues, M. et al. On-chip generation of high-dimensional entangled quantum
states and their coherent control. Nature (London) 546, 622-626 (2017).
[84] Tanzilli, S. et al. PPLN waveguide for quantum communication. Eur. Phys. J.
D 18, 155-160 (2002).
[85] Zhong, T., Wong, F. N., Roberts, T. D. & Battle, P. High performance photon-
pair source based on a fiber-coupled periodically poled KTiOPO 4 waveguide.
Opt. Express 17, 12019-12030 (2009).
134
[86] Zhong, T., Wong, F. N. C., Restelli, A. & Bienfang, J. C. Efficient
single-spatial-mode periodically-poled KTiOPO4 waveguide source for high-
dimensional entanglement-based quantum key distribution. Opt. Express 20,
26868-26877 (2012).
[871 Kwiat, P. G. et al. New High-Intensity Source of Polarization-Entangled Photon
Pairs. Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 4337-4341 (1995).
[88] Franson, J. D. Bell inequality for position and time. Phys. Rev. Lett. 62,
2205-2208 (1989).
[89] Thew, R. T., Nemoto, K., White, A. G. & Munro, W. J. Qudit quantum-state
tomography. Phys. Rev. A 66, 012303 (2002).
[90] Thew, R. T., Acin, A., Zbinden, H. & Gisin, N. Bell-Type Test of Energy-Time
Entangled Qutrits. Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 010503 (2004).
[91] Ikuta, T. & Takesue, H. Implementation of quantum state tomography for
time-bin qudits. New J. Phys. 19, 013039 (2017).
[92] Takesue, H., Inoue, K., Tadanaga, 0., Nishida, Y. & Asobe, M. Generation
of pulsed polarization-entangled photon pairs in a 1.55-ym band with a peri-
odically poled lithium niobate waveguide and an orthogonal polarization delay
circuit. Opt. Lett. 30, 293-295 (2005).
[93] Avenhaus, M., Eckstein, A., Mosley, P. J. & Silberhorn, C. Fiber-assisted single-
photon spectrograph. Opt. Lett. 34, 2873-2875 (2009).
[941 Bennett, C. V. & Kolner, B. H. Upconversion time microscope demonstrating
103 x magnification of femtosecond waveforms. Opt. Lett. 24, 783-785 (1999).
[95] Peng, C.-Z. et al. Experimental Free-Space Distribution of Entangled Photon
Pairs Over 13 km: Towards Satellite-Based Global Quantum Communication.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 150501 (2005).
[96] Schmitt-Manderbach, T. et al. Experimental Demonstration of Free-Space
Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution over 144 km. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98,
010504 (2007).
[971 Erven, C., Couteau, C., Laflamme, R. & Weihs, G. Entangled quantum key
distribution over two free-space optical links. Opt. Express 16, 16840-16853
(2008).
[98 Peloso, M. P., Gerhardt, I., Ho, C., Lamas-Linares, A. & Kurtsiefer, C. Daylight
operation of a free space, entanglement-based quantum key distribution system.
New J. Phys. 11, 045007 (2009).
[99] Wang, J.-Y. et al. Direct and full-scale experimental verifications towards
ground-satellite quantum key distribution. Nat. Photon. 7, 387-393 (2013).
135
[100] Cao, Y. et al. Entanglement-based quantum key distribution with biased basis
choice via free space. Opt. Express 21, 27260-27268 (2013).
[1011 Bourgoin, J.-P. et al. Free-space quantum key distribution to a moving receiver.
Opt. Express 23, 33437-33447 (2015).
[102] Liao, S.-K. et al. Long-distance free-space quantum key distribution in daylight
towards inter-satellite communication. Nat. Photon. 11, 509-513 (2017).
[1031 Elliott, C. et al. Current status of the DARPA Quantum Network. arXiv:quant-
ph/0503058 (2005).
[1041 Yuan, Z. & Shields, A. Continuous operation of a one-way quantum key distri-
bution system over installed telecom fibre. Opt. Express 13, 660-665 (2005).
[1051 Tanaka, A. et al. Ultra fast quantum key distribution over a 97 km installed
telecom fiber with wavelength division multiplexing clock synchronization. Opt.
Express 16, 11354-11360 (.2008).
[106] Peev, M. et al. The SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna.
New J. Phys. 11, 075001 (2009).
[1071 Stucki, D. et al. Continuous high speed coherent one-way quantum key distri-
bution. Opt. Express 17, 13326-13334 (2009).
[108] Chen, T.-Y. et al. Metropolitan all-pass and inter-city quantum communication
network. Opt. Express 18, 27217-27225 (2010).
[1091 Stucki, D. et al. Long-term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key
distribution network in a field environment. New J. Phys. 13, 123001 (2011).
[110] Sasaki, M. et al. Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD
Network. Opt. Express 19, 10387-10409 (2011).
[1111 Wang, S. et al. Field and long-term demonstration of a wide area quantum key
distribution network. Opt. Express 22, 21739-21756 (2014).
[112] Dixon, A. R. et al. High speed prototype quantum key distribution system and
long term field trial. Opt. Express 23, 7583-7592 (2015).
[1131 Bunandar, D. et al. Metropolitan quantum key distribution with silicon pho-
tonics. arXiv:1708.00434 [quant-phj (2017).
[114] Sit, A. et al. High-dimensional intracity quantum cryptography with structured
photons. Optica 4, 1006-1010 (2017).
[115] Renner, R., Gisin, N. & Kraus, B. Information-theoretic security proof for
quantum-key-distribution protocols. Phys. Rev. A 72, 012332 (2005).
136
[1161 Renner, R. & Cirac, J. I. de Finetti Representation Theorem for Infinite-
Dimensional Quantum Systems and Applications to Quantum Cryptography.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 110504 (2009).
[117] Renner, R. & K6nig, R. Universally Composable Privacy Amplification Against
Quantum Adversaries. In Proceedings of the Second Theory of Cryptography
Conference (TCC) 2005, vol. 3378 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 407-
425 (Springer, Berlin, 2005).
[1181 van Assche, G. Quantum cryptography and secret-key distillation (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2006).
[1191 Tanzilli, S. et al. Highly efficient photon-pair source using periodically poled
lithium niobate waveguide. Electron. Lett. 37, 26-28 (2001).
[120] Waks, E. et al. Secure communication: Quantum cryptography with a photon
turnstile. Nature (London) 420, 762-762 (2002).
[121] All6aume, R. et al. Experimental open-air quantum key distribution with a
single-photon source. New J. Phys. 6, 92 (2004).
1122] Intallura, P. M. et al. Quantum key distribution using a triggered quantum dot
source emitting near 1.3pm. Appl. Phys. Lett. 91, 161103 (2007).
[123] Heindel, T. et al. Quantum key distribution using quantum dot single-photon
emitting diodes in the red and near infrared spectral range. New J. Phys. 14,
083001 (2012).
(1241 Rau, M. et al. Free space quantum key distribution over 500 meters using
electrically driven quantum dot single-photon sources-a proof of principle ex-
periment. New J. Phys. 16, 043003 (2014).
[1251 Takemoto, K. et al. Quantum key distribution over 120 km using ultrahigh
purity single-photon source and superconducting single-photon detectors. Sci.
Rep. 5, 14383 (2015).
[1261 Leifgen, M. et al. Evaluation of nitrogen- and silicon-vacancy defect centres as
single photon sources in quantum key distribution. New J. Phys. 16, 023021
(2014).
[127] Brassard, G., Liitkenhaus, N., Mor, T. & Sanders, B. C. Limitations on Prac-
tical Quantum Cryptography. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330-1333 (2000).
[128 Liitkenhaus, N. Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key
distribution. Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000).
[1291 Hwang, W.-Y. Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global
Secure Communication. Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
137
[1301 Wang, X.-B. Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting Attack in Practical Quan-
tum Cryptography. Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[1311 Lo, H.-K., Ma, X. & Chen, K. Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution. Phys.
Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
[132] Ma, C. et al. Silicon photonic transmitter for polarization-encoded quantum
key distribution. Optica 3, 1274-1278 (2016).
[1331 Sibson, P. et al. Integrated silicon photonics for high-speed quantum key dis-
tribution. Optica 4, 172-177 (2017).
[134] Wang, S. et al. 2 GHz clock quantum key distribution over 260 km of standard
telecom fiber. Opt. Lett. 37, 1008-1010 (2012).
[135] Bell, J. S. On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics. Rev.
Mod. Phys. 38, 447-452 (1966).
[136] Clauser, J. F., Horne, M. A., Shimony, A. & Holt, R. A. Proposed Experiment
to Test Local Hidden-Variable Theories. Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880-884 (1969).
[137] Giustina, M. et al. Significant-Loophole-Free Test of Bell's Theorem with En-
tangled Photons. Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 250401 (2015).
[138] Shalm, L. K. et al. Strong Loophole-Free Test of Local Realism. Phys. Rev.
Lett. 115, 250402 (2015).
[139] Barrett, J., Hardy, L. & Kent, A. No Signaling and Quantum Key Distribution.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 010503 (2005).
[140] Acfn, A. et al. Device-Independent Security of Quantum Cryptography against
Collective Attacks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007).
[141] Acin, A., Massar, S. & Pironio, S. Efficient quantum key distribution secure
against no-signalling eavesdroppers. New J. Phys. 8, 126 (2006).
[142] Pironio, S. et al. Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against
collective attacks. New J. Phys. 11, 045021 (2009).
[143] Vazirani, U. & Vidick, T. Fully Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 140501 (2014).
[144] Briegel, H.-J., Diir, W., Cirac, J. I. & Zoller, P. Quantum Repeaters: The Role
of Imperfect Local Operations in Quantum Communication. Phys. Rev. Lett.
81, 5932-5935 (1998).
[145] Wootters, W. K. & Zurek, W. H. A single quantum cannot be cloned. Nature
(London) 299, 802-803 (1982).
138
[1461 Deutsch, D. et al. Quantum Privacy Amplification and the Security of Quantum
Cryptography over Noisy Channels. Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 2818-2821 (1996).
[147] Lo, H.-K. & Chau, H. F. Unconditional Security of Quantum Key Distribution
over Arbitrarily Long Distances. Science 283, 2050-2056 (1999).
[1481 Shor, P. W. & Preskill, J. Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key
Distribution Protocol. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441-444 (2000).
[1491 Kraus, B., Gisin, N. & Renner, R. Lower and Upper Bounds on the Secret-
Key Rate for Quantum Key Distribution Protocols Using One-Way Classical
Communication. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005).
[1501 Tomamichel, M., Lim, C. C. W., Gisin, N. & Renner, R. Tight finite-key
analysis for quantum cryptography. Nat. Commun. 32, 634 (2012).
[151] Grosshans, F. & Cerf, N. J. Continuous-Variable Quantum Cryptography is
Secure against Non-Gaussian Attacks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 047905 (2004).
[1521 Navascu6s, M., Grosshans, F. & Acfn, A. Optimality of Gaussian Attacks
in Continuous-Variable Quantum Cryptography. Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 190502
(2006).
[153] Garcia-Patron, R. & Cerf, N. J. Unconditional Optimality of Gaussian Attacks
against Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 97,
190503 (2006).
[1541 Furrer, F. et al. Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution: Finite-Key
Analysis of Composable Security against Coherent Attacks. Phys. Rev. Lett.
109, 100502 (2012).
[155] Leverrier, A. Composable Security Proof for Continuous-Variable Quantum
Key Distribution with Coherent States. Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 070501 (2015).
[156] Scarani, V. QKD: a million signal task. In Horodecki, R., Kilin, S. Y. &
Kowalik, J. (eds.) Quantum Cryptography and Computing, 76-82 (IOS Press,
2010).
[157] Scarani, V. & Renner, R. Quantum Cryptography with Finite Resources: Un-
conditional Security Bound for Discrete-Variable Protocols with One-Way Post-
processing. Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 200501 (2008).
[158] Leverrier, A., Grosshans, F. & Grangier, P. Finite-size analysis of a continuous-
variable quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. A 81, 062343 (2010).
[159] Sheridan, L. & Scarani, V. Security proof for quantum key distribution using
qudit systems. Phys. Rev. A 82, 030301 (2010).
139
[1601 Law, C. K. & Eberly, J. H. Analysis and Interpretation of High Transverse
Entanglement in Optical Parametric Down Conversion. Phys. Rev. Lett. 92,
127903 (2004).
[161] Franson, J. D. Nonlocal cancellation of dispersion. Phys. Rev. A 45, 3126-3132
(1992).
[1621 Lodewyck, J. et al. Quantum key distribution over 25 km with an all-fiber
continuous-variable system. Phys. Rev. A 76, 042305 (2007).
[163] Weedbrook, C. et al. Gaussian quantum information. Rev. Mod. Phys. 84,
621-669 (2012).
[1641 Devetak, I. & Winter, A. Distillation of secret key and entanglement from
quantum states. Proc. R. Soc. A: Math. Phys. Engineer. Sci. 461, 207-235
(2005).
[165] Cai, R. Y. Q. & Scarani, V. Finite-key analysis for practical implementations
of quantum key distribution. New J. Phys. 11, 045024 (2009).
[166] Sheridan, L., Le, T. P. & Scarani, V. Finite-key security against coherent
attacks in quantum key distribution. New J. Phys. 12, 123019 (2010).
[167] Sheridan, L. & Scarani, V. Erratum: Security proof for quantum key distribu-
tion using qudit systems [Phys. Rev. A 82, 030301(R) (2010)]. Phys. Rev. A
83, 039901(E) (2011).
[168] Gisin, N., Ribordy, G., Tittel, W. & Zbinden, H. Quantum cryptography. Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145-195 (2002).
[169] Lo, H.-K., Chau, H. F. & Ardehali, M. Efficient Quantum Key Distribution
Scheme and a Proof of Its Unconditional Security. Journal of Cryptology 18,
133-165 (2005).
[170] Jouguet, P., Kunz-Jacques, S., Leverrier, A., Grangier, P. & Diamanti, E.
Experimental demonstration of long-distance continuous-variable quantum key
distribution. Nat. Photon. 7, 378-381 (2013).
[171] Robinson, B. S. et al. 781 Mbit/s photon-counting optical communications
using a superconducting nanowire detector. Opt. Lett. 31, 444-446 (2006).
[1721 Stucki, D. et al. High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250 km
of ultra low loss fibres. New J. Phys. 11, 075003 (2009).
[173] Fr6hlich, B. et al. Long-distance quantum key distribution secure against co-
herent attacks. Optica 4, 163-167 (2017).
[174] Ma, X., Qi, B., Zhao, Y. & Lo, H.-K. Practical decoy state for quantum key
distribution. Phys. Rev. A 72, 012326 (2005).
140
[175] Bunandar, D., Zhang, Z., Shapiro, J. H. & Englund, D. R. Practical high-
dimensional quantum key distribution with decoy states. Phys. Rev. A 91,
022336 (2015).
[1761 Bao, H., Bao, W., Wang, Y., Zhou, C. & Chen, R. Finite-key analysis of a
practical decoy-state high-dimensional quantum key distribution. J. Phys. A:
Mathematical and Theoretical 49, 205301 (2016).
[1771 Ribordy, G., Brendel, J., Gautier, J.-D., Gisin, N. & Zbinden, H. Long-distance
entanglement-based quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. A 63, 012309 (2000).
1178] Rubenok, A., Slater, J. A., Chan, P., Lucio-Martinez, I. & Tittel, W. Real-
World Two-Photon Interference and Proof-of-Principle Quantum Key Distribu-
tion Immune to Detector Attacks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130501 (2013).
1179] Costa, B., Mazzoni, D., Puleo, M. & Vezzoni, E. Phase Shift Technique for the
Measurement of Chromatic Dispersion in Optical Fibers Using LED's. IEEE
Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques 30, 1497-1503 (1982).
[180] Derickson, D. (ed.) Fiber Optic Test and Measurement. Hewlett-Packard pro-
fessional books (Prentice Hall PTR, 2007).
[181] Rosenberg, D., Kerman, A. J., Molnar, R. J. & Dauler, E. A. High-speed and
high-efficiency superconducting nanowire single photon detector array. Opt.
Express 21, 1440-1447 (2013).
[182] Kerman, A. J. et al. Kinetic-inductance-limited reset time of superconducting
nanowire photon counters. Appl. Phys. Lett. 88, 111116 (2006).
[183] Kerman, A. J., Rosenberg, D., Molnar, R. J. & Dauler, E. A. Readout of
superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors at high count rates. Journal
of Applied Physics 113, 144511 (2013).
[184] Dauler, E. A. et al. Review of superconducting nanowire single-photon detector
system design options and demonstrated performance. Opt. Eng. 53, 081907
(2014).
[185] Marsili, F. et al. Detecting single infrared photons with 93% system efficiency.
Nat. Photon. 7, 210-214 (2013).
[186] Valivarthi, R. et al. Efficient Bell state analyzer for time-bin qubits with fast-
recovery WSi superconducting single photon detectors. Opt. Express 22, 24497-
24506 (2014).
[187] Yoshino, K.-I. et al. High-speed wavelength-division multiplexing quantum key
distribution system. Opt. Lett. 37, 223-225 (2012).
[188] Grein, M. E., Stevens, M. L., Hardy, N. D. & Dixon, P. B. Stabilization of
Long, Deployed Optical Fiber Links for Quantum Networks. In Conference on
Lasers and Electro-Optics, FTu4F.6 (Optical Society of America, 2017).
141
[189] Wiseman, H. M., Jones, S. J. & Doherty, A. C. Steering, Entanglement, Nonlo-
cality, and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 140402
(2007).
[190] Jones, S. J., Wiseman, H. M. & Doherty, A. C. Entanglement, Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen correlations, Bell nonlocality, and steering. Phys. Rev. A 76,
052116 (2007).
[1911 Cavalcanti, E. G., Jones, S. J., Wiseman, H. M. & Reid, M. D. Experimental
criteria for steering and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Phys. Rev. A
80, 032112 (2009).
[192] Skrzypczyk, P., Navascu6s, M. & Cavalcanti, D. Quantifying Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen Steering. Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 180404 (2014).
[193] White, A. G. et al. Measuring two-qubit gates. J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 24, 172-183
(2007).
[194] Giihne, 0. & T6th, G. Entanglement detection. Physics Reports 474, 1-75
(2009).
[195] Brunner, N., Cavalcanti, D., Pironio, S., Scarani, V. & Weiner, S. Bell nonlo-
cality. Rev. Mod. Phys. 86, 419-478 (2014).
[196] Saunders, D. J., Jones, S. J., Wiseman, H. M. & Pryde, G. J. Experimental
EPR-steering using Bell-local states. Nat. Phys. 6, 845-849 (2010).
[197] Werner, R. F. Quantum states with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations ad-
mitting a hidden-variable model. Phys. Rev. A 40, 4277-4281 (1989).
[198] Acmn, A., Gisin, N. & Toner, B. Grothendieck's constant and local models for
noisy entangled quantum states. Phys. Rev. A 73, 062105 (2006).
[199] Smith, D. H. et al. Conclusive quantum steering with superconducting
transition-edge sensors. Nat. Commun. 3, 625 (2012).
[200] Bennet, A. J. et al. Arbitrarily Loss-Tolerant Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Steer-
ing Allowing a Demonstration over 1 km of Optical Fiber with No Detection
Loophole. Phys. Rev. X 2, 031003 (2012).
[2011 Wittmann, B. et al. Loophole-free Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment via
quantum steering. New J. Phys. 14, 053030 (2012).
[202] Hensen, B. et al. Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins
separated by 1.3 kilometres. Nature (London) 526, 682-686 (2015).
[203] Branciard, C., Cavalcanti, E. G., Walborn, S. P., Scarani, V. & Wiseman, H. M.
One-sided device-independent quantum key distribution: Security, feasibility,
and the connection with steering. Phys. Rev. A 85, 010301 (2012).
142
12041 Bao, H.-Z. et al. Time-energy high-dimensional one-side device-independent
quantum key distribution. Chinese Physics B 26, 050302 (2017).
[2051 Schneeloch, J., Dixon, P. B., Howland, G. A., Broadbent, C. J. & Howell,
J. C. Violation of Continuous-Variable Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Steering with
Discrete Measurements. Phys. Rev. Lett. 110, 130407 (2013).
[206] Dixon, P. B., Howland, G. A., Schneeloch, J. & Howell, J. C. Quantum Mutual
Information Capacity for High-Dimensional Entangled States. Phys. Rev. Lett.
108, 143603 (2012).
[2071 Lo, H.-K., Curty, M. & Qi, B. Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key
Distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503 (2012).
143
